This was the nearest thing Australia has ever had to a fully loaded jet airliner disaster in which the aircraft was damaged yet no-one was killed or injured.
ATSB: EK 407's last point of contact after running out of runway
The timelines and graphics in the ATSB preliminary factual report show that Emirates flight EK 407 and the 275 people on board were seconds and centimetres from a fiery death when it left Melbourne Airport, still touching the ground, on a flight to Dubai on the night of 20 March.
It was an incredibly screwed up take off considering that the take off roll had been underway for 60 seconds before any sense of urgency becomes apparent in a cockpit occupied by the captain and first officer and the two relief pilots in observer seats at the start of a flight that usually takes around 14 hours 30 minutes.
ATSB: Some of the key strokes and strikes described in the report
The core fact, that the weight entered in the flight management computer for the flexible thrust takeoff was 100 tonnes under the real weight of the Airbus A345 doesn’t account for the extraordinary time it took for corrective action to be initiated on the flight deck.
The jet was smashing lights and antennas at and beyond the end of the runway in the third of three tail strikes just as the throttles were pushed to the full thrust detent.
ATSB: Part of a jet doing 300 kmh made this hole
ATSB: EK 407's tracks beyond the end of the runway
It was almost 300 metres past the end of the runway before the jet really began to climb away from the ground.
But while the pilots have ‘resigned’ from their careers, the real safety issue is the serious doubts about the competency and standards of Emirates which are implied in this sequence of events.
The airline is responsible for training, checking and standards. It is responsible for the conditions under which flight crew work.
The airline has a terrific reputation for passenger service and strategic thinking in developing its Dubai hub.
But what is going on in its flight standards division for the events on EK 407 this night to have even been possible?
These are some of the highlights of the timeline (in UTC) in the ATSB report, as the jet began to take off from runway 16, which is 3657 metres long, showing the distance remaining at each point.
11.30.49 Brakes released, 3540 metres to go.
11.31.55 Rotation starts, 886 metres.
11.31.57 Nose gear uncompressed (off ground), 727 metres.
11.32.03 First of three tail strikes, captain orders full power TOGA, 229 metres left.
11.32.03 Levers moved to TOGA detent, 0 metres.
11.32.07 Main wheels uncompressed, 115 metres beyond end of runway.
11.32.09 Positive climb begins, 292 metres past end of runway (where the ground falls gradually below airport height).
11.32.46 Landing gear retracted (possibly near houses).
The flight climbed to 7000 feet and dumped fuel over Port Phillip Bay to reduce its weight to a safer level for landing.
The jet was severely damaged by the accident. No-one on board was injured.
The speed of the jet when it tore out fixtures at and beyond the end of the runway was at least 290.8 kmh.
The airline is quoted by the ATSB as saying it will review some of its procedures.
The jet was using (as almost all airliners do) a reduced thrust ‘flexible’ take off process that saves on engine wear and tear but is calculated to produce a safe takeoff, even with an engine failure, on the runway available, provided the data used by the flight management computers is the RIGHT data.
The captain had flown for 98.9 hours in the previous 30 days, or nearly 20 hours longer than most Qantas pilots might expect from a roster, while the first officer had racked up 89.7 duty hours.
These factual disclosures by the ATSB ought to cause a serious review by Emirates of key aspects of its operations.
Or they could set the scene for a truly horrific accident if left unaddressed, and one which no amount of generous sporting and cultural sponsorship deals by Emirates, which brings you the Melbourne Cup, could ever overcome.
A full reading of the ATSB report is recommended.
3 Comments
I don’t understand why this didn’t headline our local media other than my usual cynical view that Emirates sponsorship of most Australian sporting events, the ARL’s Collingwood Club as well as some Fairfax projects toned down the enormity of the accident. That international, industry and online publications went into a frenzy and the airbus is a near write-off indicates we have either a lazy, disinterested and ill-resourced press contingent or a supressed one.
I have to disagree with your comment about the “extraordinary time it took for corrective action to be initiated on the flight deck”. The amount of time between the beginning of rotation and the captain calling for full power was only 8 seconds.
Prior to rotation, a total of 66 seconds, the aircraft would have been accelerating down the runway. Any indication that this acceleration was not sufficient to allow takeoff in the remaining runway would have been difficult to perceive until a significant amount of this time had already passed.
Rarely in any aviation incident/accident can a single factor, such as pilot error, be considered the sole cause. So instead of implying this incident was entirely the crew’s fault and caused by their “incredibly screwed up take off”, how about writing a balanced piece of journalism and considering some of the other possible factors that may have contributed to this incident?
What about the use of reduced thrust take-offs by airlines to save costs?
What about the fact that the captain had flown 98.9 hours in the past 30 days? Australian law requires that “a pilot shall not fly and an operator shall not roster him or her to fly in excess of 100 hours in 30 consecutive days” (CAO S48.1 3.13)
Sooty,
Let me draw your attention to these lines in the post:-
But while the pilots have ‘resigned’ from their careers, the real safety issue is the serious doubts about the competency and standards of Emirates which are implied in this sequence of events.
The airline is responsible for training, checking and standards. It is responsible for the conditions under which flight crew work.
The airline has a terrific reputation for passenger service and strategic thinking in developing its Dubai hub.
But what is going on in its flight standards division for the events on EK 407 this night to have even been possible?
AND FURTHER DOWN:-
The captain had flown for 98.9 hours in the previous 30 days, or nearly 20 hours longer than most Qantas pilots might expect from a roster, while the first officer had racked up 89.7 duty hours.
These factual disclosures by the ATSB ought to cause a serious review by Emirates of key aspects of its operations.
Or they could set the scene for a truly horrific accident if left unaddressed, and one which no amount of generous sporting and cultural sponsorship deals by Emirates, which brings you the Melbourne Cup, could ever overcome.
(end of extract)
Now, which part of an unbalanced report are you actually concerned about?