AF447 raises important questions about airline and pilot attitudes in computer centric cockpits

No matter what the AF447 air crash investigation discovers, there are already implications for airlines.

Victim recovery from AF447. Sky News

Victim recovery from AF447. Sky News

The disaster brings back to prominence issues about the newer non-flying cultures of airline managements, their disconnection from the technical experience of their pilot cadres, and the risks of using high technology flight management systems to deliver efficiencies which may be at the cost of tighter safety margins.

None of which may prove to be relevant to the Airbus A330-200 which was operating AF447 between Rio Janeiro and Paris when it crashed early on 1 June killing all 228 people on board.

At the very least it is the catalyst for debating concerns that never quite go away, even though some of them may be founded more in change resistance than safety.

In fact the flight protection systems that have existed in varying measures and designs on every western world airliner for most of the jet age have helped make air transport vastly safer than it ever was including the 60s, when the first commercially successful jets ended the dominance of turbo props and the last of the great piston engined designs like the DC-7C, the DC-6B and the final versions of the Super Constellations, Lockheed Electras and Vickers Viscounts.

Yet questions remain. AF44 means airlines will come under some pressure to reconsider how pilots manage the highly computerised flight control systems of all types of passenger jets.

Or according to some very experienced Airbus and Boeing pilots, to reaffirm the need to fly the plane first, rather than trouble shoot the systems.

Many airlines are run by managements that no longer include anyone with piloting experience. They tend to see flying their fleets as an activity for which a semi-automated set of procedures, aided by computer intensive cockpits, can be bought as a solution off the shelf in Seattle or Toulouse, rather than as a human resource that can destroy brand value and reputation if it isn’t properly utilised.

Airline managements are about as connected to their pilots as many newspaper companies are to the journalists they call content providers.

This is without prejudice to Air France, or Qantas, which is a major A330 user and an intensely interested party in the incomplete multinational investigation being lead by the ATSB into the QF72 emergency in which an A330-300 made an emergency landing at Learmonth in WA last 7 October after serious malfunctions affected its flight control systems.

For all that anyone knows, the pilots on the Air France jet were doing everything they could as a team to retain physical control of a jet that was in diabolical trouble for reasons that are far from being fully understood.

But the questions about how high technology jets are best flown has never gone away, and a bad accident makes their being debated more audible.

The most computer reliant airliner yet built, the electric-plastic Boeing 787 Dreamliner now seems close to making its first flight after many delays.

And those Dreamliners, of which 800 are on order will be followed by a slightly larger capacity Airbus family, the A350s, which is also designed around the latest iteration of the concept of pilots managing computerised flight systems which the European consortium pioneered more than any other manufacturer with its A320 single aisle family which has now been in service for 20 years.

Airbus itself emphasised the importance of flying the plane first in the bulletin it send to all A330 users less than two days after the Air France A330-200 crashed into the mid Atlantic ocean after sending a puzzling stream of service messages that appear to document the aftermath of events that caused a serious deterioration of systems and controllability of the jet in its final minutes early on 1 June.

Boeing has also referred in detail to this need in the design of the so-called gauntlet tests which the prototype Dreamliner completed a day ago. In those tests the jet was spoofed into thinking it was in flight while sitting on the ground with engines running and electrics on, testing the failure scenarios that pilots could encounter by shutting down various combinations of systems to validate the responses required on the flight deck.

Boeing said it wouldn’t even think of asking its test pilots to fly the 787 until these crucial procedures for dealing with systems issues had been validated as much as is possible in ground simulations.

The airlines and safety authorities need to ask if the culture of professional piloting is being degraded inadvertently by an automated approach to operating procedures, or unduly influenced by pressure to fly the most direct route available, meaning closer to severe weather than would have been considered prudent 25 or more years ago.

It is true of most airlines that a pilot who makes a 200 kilometre detour to avoid a belt of storms will be grilled about his or her decision by airline management. It is a process that can intimidate career minded pilots into flying places where traps can lie hidden in the radar imagery of a cluster of storms.

In part of an immense debate on these issues in the comments section to Tom Vasquez’s Weathergraphics site one A330 pilot says of his Air France peers:-

I would think that they could have picked their way through the line with just some moderate turbulence. I will comment however, that there seems to be increasing pressure to deviate as little as possible from the proposed flight plan, and never to do so without a prearranged clearance (which takes time) unless the captain declares an emergency. The tracking system aboard the latest aircraft automatically reports the slightest deviation to oceanic ATC, and the captain will be explaining himself or facing violation if that occurs. Perhaps this incident will result in giving a little more latitude to the flight crews for weather avoidance without consequence.

It needs emphasising that this may prove irrelevant to the fate of AF447, but the questions merit discussion.

At last count 41 bodies have been recovered from the crash zone, and US and French naval equipment which can locate and recover the all important ‘black box’ flight data and cockpit voice recorders will arrive at the scene between tomorrow and Friday.

9 Comments

  1. Ellis Taylor
    Posted June 10, 2009 at 5:32 pm | Permalink

    To be fair Ben, the quote you’ve posted there doesn’t really implicate airline management and their drives for efficiency – more like ATC and its apparent inflexibilities.

    On your main point though, regarding the interactions of pilots and computer systems, this is something which needs to be looked at every time there is a form of system upset which results in an incident. I think more and more it will lead to pilots getting more training in systems management/troubleshooting, while also being given greater lattitude to just ‘fly the plane.’ In many ways, this has long been Boeing’s design philosophy which is one of the reasons they were relatively late with FBW, and even then (I am told) it has different flight control parameters to Airbus’s systems which many pilots (rightly or wrongly – I’m not a pilot so I don’t know) seem to feel gives them less control. All up, I think it will lead to pilots getting greater education in human/machine factors, as much as they have on CRM, threat & error management and the like.

  2. Keith is not my real name
    Posted June 10, 2009 at 7:47 pm | Permalink

    ” but the questions merit discussion”

    Indeed, they do

  3. Glengarryboy
    Posted June 10, 2009 at 7:55 pm | Permalink

    Ben – ‘fly the plane first’ – as I said in my comment last week, I heard my RAAF pilot colleagues say this so often and this was mostly in pre high tech aircraft as we have now. The most interesting story I heard in the 1980s was about a US C-130 Hercules on a SAR mission. Everyone, including both pilots, were so busy looking out the windows for something in the water that the Herc just rolled over and crashed into the sea.
    Re FBW, surely a current concern would be the training of pilots directly onto popular RPT airliners as FOs without gaining experience on smaller aircraft first. To me, this is just crazy but it seems to be foreign airlines recruiting these ‘graduates’, not QF or Virginblue. Training this way on FBW would remove any feel that these pilots would have for real flying. One of the reasons Australia has such a good RPT flying record is that many pilots in the past flew smaller aircraft in ‘tiger country’ in PNG before returning to Australia to fly RPT.
    Maybe as a result of AF447, manufacturers might revisit the issue of the amount of control pilots have in commercial FBW aircraft.

    Alex

  4. LongTimeObserver
    Posted June 10, 2009 at 9:07 pm | Permalink

    It’s more than this, Ben, it’s certification of Transport Category aircraft to standards that do not anticipate or require tests of cascades of failures that may render SAS-dependent aircraft unflyable.

  5. spacedog
    Posted June 11, 2009 at 12:05 am | Permalink

    I don’t know how any blame can be assigned to ATC or their procedures regarding AF447 (first comment above). As successful as the Airbus family of aircraft has been over the past 35 years, there are still doubts in my mind about their FBW system and the heavy reliance on automation, electronic sensors, and computers. I know a few RPT pilots – one in Europe currently commands an Airbus A320. He says that …”there is enormous dishonesty about these (Airbus) aircraft….” and the pro-Airbus people won’t hear of a single word being spoken against any aspect of their design. For example, dual inputs (ie, by both pilots simultaneously) to the control sticks are “hidden” in Airbus aircraft and very dangerous, whereas at least the Boeing B777 has retained the control column with a FBW system so both pilots can see existing inputs from the other. Not saying this was an issue with AF447 but it keeps cropping up overseas with incidents or accidents involving Airbus aircraft.

  6. blasto
    Posted June 11, 2009 at 9:46 am | Permalink

    Whether or not reliance upon instrument FBW technology is excessive is a non sequitur.

    One only needs to reflect on the Aeroperu accident, in which the craft was flown into the sea without any automation systems controlling it.

    The important issue IMHO, is to introduce more redundancy in flight systems to avoid both human and computer error.

  7. spacedog
    Posted June 11, 2009 at 2:05 pm | Permalink

    Fortunately, all modern jet aircraft contain multiple redundancies and Airbus to their credit incorporate significant redundancy – for example, 3 primary and 2 secondary, independent, flight control computers, any one of which can act as the master computer when others fail. Unfortunately, the automated diagnostic messages that were transmitted before all contact was lost indicated that not only had every computer failed, but even the independent standby instrument system had failed too (on top of the failure of the primary instrument system). Following that, all three Inertial Reference Systems failed leaving the pilots effectively ‘blind’. So tragically in this instance, all this amazing redundancy meant nothing in the end.

  8. caf
    Posted June 12, 2009 at 4:21 pm | Permalink

    spacedog, all that may indicate is that the automated diagnostic system kept functioning while the aircraft broke apart, and was one of the last things to fail.

  9. Mitchell Ward
    Posted July 3, 2009 at 9:43 am | Permalink

    I stumbled across this great blog from an Airbus A321 pilot in the US.

    http://flightlevel390.blogspot.com/

    Gives a graphic account of various flights and includes a post on Fly-By-Wire flight management systems etc.

    The current post is a fantastic account of a flight around thundestorms that makes mention of AF447.

    Take a look.

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