Various analysts have warned that counter measures to the JSF are being developed and deployed much faster than the troubled project is moving towards delivery.
One of them, an authoritative and experienced military identity, who wishes to remain anonymous until he chooses otherwise, has sent us a review of this dilemma for the JSF in language accessible to lay readers.
Joseph Stalin is quoted as saying: “Quantity has a quality all its own”. And so it goes with the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. America plans to provide about 2,500 to its Armed Forces, and Lockheed Martin plans to sell another 1,000 to the USA’s Allies. The more hopeful marketers in Lockheed Martin are suggesting that the JSF will annihilate its competition, creating a monopoly market for up to 6,000 aircraft.
How people feel about this quantity of F-35 JSFs depends on two factors – firstly whether the aircraft will be protecting or attacking them, and secondly whether it will be effective or ineffective at National-Defence-critical roles such as air dominance and penetrating strike.
Many in the Western World have full confidence in the F-35 ‘Lightning II’, and are comfortable with the thought that this world-wide armada of aircraft will protect them, their Nation and its global interests. They are willing to pay an unknown price for the privilege. Cost estimates have the price at least $150M a copy – the most expensive production fighter aircraft – ever.
Outside the West, the view is different. How would Nations like Russia and China feel about having 3,500 combat aircraft arraigned at them? Insecure? Threatened? Non-Western military arms companies might see this differently. A threat of this magnitude presents a huge opportunity to develop effective countermeasures which can be sold in large volumes for large profits.
And so Russian and Chinese military arms companies have been investing substantial resources in analyzing the F-35 JSF to find ‘chinks’ in its armor. They draw on the immutable laws of physics to find their answers and opportunities.
‘Stealth’ is the main attribute that the Lightning II relies on for its combat effectiveness. The simple logic is: ‘If you can’t see me, you can’t kill me’. After the success of predecessor ‘stealth’ aircraft like the F-117 Nighthawk, the F-22A Raptor and the B-2 Spirit, ‘stealth’ has been ‘designed-in’ the JSF – but with compromises made to yield ‘affordability’.
In the 1990′s the main threat to air combat aircraft was radar with wavelengths of about 10 cm. Deflecting these incoming waves away from receivers and absorbing those that cannot be deflected is the stratagem for creating ‘Low Observable’ aircraft. In the F-35, this has been achieved quite well for the front quarter, with the radar-cross-section about the size of a golf ball. From other aspects, building a truly ‘stealthy’ aircraft is expensive, so ‘affordability’, and the sheer physical difficulty of ‘stealthing’ slab-sides and complex, open shapes like jet nozzles, means that the all aspect observability is not ‘golf ball’ all-round, but ‘Pacman’ – low from the front, but higher from other directions. And large enough for the more powerful 10cm radars to detect, engage and kill it.
At frequencies longer than 10cm, another problem appears. Low frequency radars with wavelengths of a couple of metres – TV frequencies – resonate on aircraft structures and produce strong returns. Absorption is not an option, as the layers would be so thick as to make the aircraft un-flyable.
Then there are the equally troublesome higher frequencies, such as Infrared. The F-35 JSF’s F-135 engine is the most powerful and hot air-combat engine ever made. As it takes a lot of power to propel a ‘chunky’ stealth aircraft, a lot of heat is generated. So the Lightning II has a large Infrared signature, and its size and design does not allow these emissions to be masked as was done for the F-117, the B-2 and to some degree, the F-22A.
Finally, ‘Network Centric Warfare’ has become the flavour of the second Millennium. Mobile networks rely on radio transmissions and receptions, so are inherently ‘un-stealthy’. While it might confer a tactical advantage to be ‘network connected’, the transmissions are sources that can be detected, especially in electrically quiet areas like the Pacific Ocean. Networks that rely on nodes such as Airborne Early Warning and Control Aircraft are subject to attack and destruction, partially blinding network dependent aircraft like the JSF in the process.
So, with these physical realities, how have the Russian and Chinese military weapons designers responded to the prospect of being surrounded by thousands of F-35 JSFs?
Air Combat
The Russian response can be seen in aircraft such as the Sukhoi Su-35-1. This fighter aircraft is an evolution of the widely admired Su-27 series. The large size of the aircraft and its ability to generate large amounts of electrical power has resulted in it being fitted with the most powerful air-to-air fighter radar currently in production, and the large antenna gives it a high sensitivity. ‘Low Observability’ is not ‘No Observability’. If radar is powerful enough, and sensitive enough, it will detect and track small radar-cross-section targets.
And so it is with the F-35 JSF. Even front-on detection ranges are sufficient to guide air-to-air missiles, and for other aspects the detection range is much longer than the missile range. One of the difficulties with air combat is that there are usually lots of combatants, and so it is impossible to keep your low-observable nose pointed at all enemy aircraft. The later model Sukhois are equipped with their own intra-flight network, so even if the Lightning II points its nose at one Sukhoi, it presents its ‘Pacman’ signature to another. With shared detections, one Sukhoi can be detecting the Lightning II and another guiding a missile at it.
What about the Lightning II’s large, unmasked Infrared signature? Sukhois have for decades employed ‘InfraRed Scan and Track’ (IRST) sensors as an integral part of their weapons system. They also employ Infrared sensors on their Beyond Visual Range (BVR) missiles. So, a Lightning II JSF may be quietly cruising along minding it own business, only to find a non-radiating Sukhoi detects it and fires an Infrared guided BVR missile. The F-35′s first alarm might be the Distributed Aperture System (DAS) detecting the gliding, cool missile at very close range. Whether this detection range provides adequate warning for effective countermeasures is a matter of conjecture, but the smart money is on the missile.
Even the F-35′s ‘Network Centric Warfare’ transmitters, and the aircraft’s radar, albeit ‘Low Probability of Intercept’ (LPI) become missile magnets to a new class of seeker head – passive homers. These missiles are guided to the proximity of a radiating source and then home on any electrical transmission in front of the seeker. As electronic devices become more sensitive, passive homers become more effective. Since these BVR missiles emit nothing, they give no warning of their approach, and present the F-35′s DAS with the same challenge as Infrared homing missiles.
Strike Penetration
One of the striking differences (excuse the pun,) between the Russian and Chinese order-of-battle and that of the West, is that the West has invested very little in ‘area denial’ weapons like Surface to Air Missile (SAM) systems. In contrast, Russia, greatly concerned with being surrounded and having its cities like Moscow attacked, has invested a great proportion of their military budget in SAM systems, and has done so for decades. As a result, they have great depth of understanding of the technology.
Recent developments in solid-state digital electronics have greatly improved the capability and reliability of these systems. Furthermore, their operations analysis and miniaturization has guided the development of ‘shoot and scoot’ systems, typically with five minutes or less from set-up, shoot and an evasion movement. This rapid mobility is sufficient to avoid attacks from weapons designed to find and destroy SAMS. Aircraft like the F-35 which rely on the free-fall Small Diameter Bomb (SDB) cannot attack one of these mobile SAM sites and escape without being shot-down by a missile.
Detecting ‘Low Observability’ aircraft targets is easier for ground based systems than for aircraft-based systems, because the constraints on power and aperture are largely removed for these SAM sensors. Where a Sukhoi radar might see the ‘Low Observability’ F-35 at 50 km, a ground-based radar could find it at 150 km – well outside the release range of the SDB and well inside the engagement range of the SAM’s missiles.
It gets worse. The Russians have been reviving Television Frequency radars – and making the beam electronically ‘steerable’ and placing the whole radar on a five minute ‘shoot and scoot’ truck chassis. A two metre wavelength will produce strong returns from the Lightning II’s body. Returns from these radars is of course networked into the SAM’s fire control system, and the large antenna gives sufficiently accurate tracking that the missile can be guided to its detection and tracing distance from these low frequency radars alone. A JSF monitoring the battle-space for the usual SAM high frequencies may miss the low-frequency tracking and consequently be surprised by a guided missile’s attack radar at close range.
And if that is not bad enough, there are the passive detectors. There are different types. The first ‘listens’ with several detectors widely spaced on a range of frequencies that cover the JSF’s own radar and networking transmissions, compares the time-of-arrival, and builds up a track of the JSF’s passage. These tracks are also networked into the SAM sites. The second uses reflections from TV, FM and mobile telephone transmissions and through signal processing, finds and tracks an aircraft, even if it is not radiating. As these systems are passive, it is impossible for a JSF to know that its presence has been detected and is passage tracked.
Point Defences are also proliferating. These are truck-sized self-contained, but networked, SAMs and sometimes integrated radar-directed guns. You could call these ‘Mini-SAMs’. They are designed to catch incoming ‘leakers’ to protect larger SAM systems. Their missiles are rapid-fire and agile, and can detect and engage small targets like the SDBs. The threat for penetrating strike aircraft like the F-35 JSF is that the Point Defence weapons can be instructed to remain silent and undetectable until an F-35 JSF is within its detection and engagement range, and where the F-35 is unable to escape, when the Mini-SAM activates its sensors and shoots a volley of missiles or guns. Again, the smart money is on the Mini-SAMs.
The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter – Predator or Prey?
In the 1990′s environment for which the F-35 JSF was designed, it would definitely have been a predator. Its ‘Low Observability’ would have worked effectively against the low power, low sensitivity airborne sensors, lacking networked situational awareness. For many of the fixed SAM systems, it could have threaded its way safely past the fixed installations, and have come close enough to attack with its free-fall bombs.
In the 2015-25 future when the F-35 JSF is expected to become operational, it will encounter a very different world. Its potential enemies have been assiduous in exploiting its weaknesses, especially in over-powering its stealth defences, networking so what one engagement system misses, another will catch, deploying effective sensors at frequencies where the F-35 cannot hide, and with long and short range engagement missiles and guns that can be directed to within killing range.
Every dog has its day. For the 1990s environment, the JSF was a predating winner. Time and tide has moved on, and in the 2015-2025 era, it looks increasingly that the innovative application of the Laws of Physics and rapid development of effective JSF engagement weapons systems makes it more likely that the future JSF will be prey.
Nations relying solely on the F-35 JSF for domination of the air and unfettered penetration of an adversary’s battle space do so at their own risk and peril.
20 Comments
When I worked in the defence industry I used to call this the double fighter. It’s taking double the time to build, costing double the money, you’ll need twice as many …
Pretty damning analysis. Is it not the case that the countermeasures you describe are effective against a wide spectrum of aircraft, not just the JSF?
So, I ask, if not the JSF, then what?
And why is this, Darryl?
Could it be because whenever proponents of the JSF are asked what the jet will cost, they quote the ubiquitous average Unit Recurring Flyaway Cost (avg URFC)?
The latest marketing speal from the JSF Program puts this figure for the F-35A at some US$49 million in 2002 dollars?
Projecting this figure, using standard TVM arithmetic, using an inflation only factor of 3% per annum puts the URFC in 2014 at some US$69.8 million a copy. This is based on figures provided by the JSF Program and does not include any consideration for any of inherent risks materialising.
According to the US DoD Acquisition University, the ‘Price’ for any aircraft is represented by what is known as the Unit Procurement Cost (UPC).
This is the URFC plus the Unit Non-Recurring Flyaway Costs (UNRFC) plus the costs for tooling, technical documentation and manuals, operational training and training systems, maintenance training and training systems, quality assurance, initial spares, etc. – in other words, the full costs for putting an operational aircraft on the ramp.
As a result, for the JSF Program:
Unit Recurring Flyaway Cost (URFC) x ~2.2 = Unit Procurement Cost (UPC)
or, in more plain speak:
In 2014, the per unit ‘Price’ for the F-35A JSF will be about US$153.7 million plus/minus any variance from an inflation figure of 3% per annum PLUS the costs of any of the multitude of risks in this program materialising.
For this program and for this aircraft design, the latter is the biggy.
Bottom Line:
When our people in Defence and the DMO said the JSF F-35A will only cost the Australian tax payer “around forty million dollars per aircraft”, they were not telling the whole story and they still aren’t.
Oh Peter’s (and others) analysis of the F-35′s shortcomings are well founded. We can also add the ‘fighter mafia’ crowd in the US (children of Boyd) and (some of them) actual designers of the ‘Teen’ series of fighters whIch for the first time ever in US history were markedly superior to everything else.
What has to remembered is the the US has produced some real rubbish over the decades. Usually lagging behind the old USSR, as it did Germany in WW2 and made nothing in WW1. Their domestic effort in WW2 was markedly inferior to the UK except for the Mustang, which used a British engine and was built to British specs .. and the US didn’t want it.
Few of their planes they have made were ‘good’ since WW2. F-4, F-111, F-105, F-104 .. the list of rubbish is extensive. Plus their combat records were atrocious. Take out the usual lies (3:1 [at least] overclaiming in WW2 for example, vs UK and German 1.5:1 overclaiming). Massive overclaiming again in Korea and Vietnam.With all the Russian records now available we know they were roughly 1:1 .. at best … against Russian pilots in MIG’s. With all the bomber losses they were well behind the game.
Enter Boyd and his team. They actually built some excellent planes then: F-16 (almost perfect), F-15 expensive and a bit of a hanger queen but still pretty good. F-18, basically a F-16 with 2 engines and a shorter range. The F-14 was rubbish .. but that’s the US Navy for you.
Now this is where I depart from Airpower Australia: since then it has all be c**p .. including the F-22. The F-22 only looks good against the F-35 (anything does though) but, despite its 30 year birth and all the high tech and insane cost .. it is a hanger queen and always will be (as is the B-2). Plus, according to some experts (like the F-16, etc crowd) its performance is a lot poorer than the propaganda we are being fed. In WVR combat (which is what really happens) it might get a 1:1 exchange .. at $US350 a pop = a lose.
So Oz’s options are .. interesting. Me I’d go for SU-30′s with western electronics. There never has been a modern fighter so perfect for our unique needs. At a pinch a mix of Grippens and the new upgraded F-15′s.
Tom,
The problem with acquiring Su-30s or even the Su-35-1 (putting aside the ‘political’ ramifications) is that we would only end up with Parity, when the air power state of Air Dominance is what is required to maintain peace.
As for the F-22, working from the basics, this is one mean muther.
All the current hype regarding the high maintenance costs is a result of poor implementation of the design, such as the flawed coatings and such consequences as moisture ingress leading to corrosion in places never expected.
Technically, there are straightforward and simple fixes for this but these are being overshadowed by emotive based argument and politics.
As for the F-22 costs, the inflated figures of $300+ million a copy are the total program cost amortised across a far smaller production number than originally intended.
The actual RDT&E costs for the F-22A were about $29.5 Bn which, when spread across 187 units, equates to $157.8 million per aircraft. This is a sunk cost (already spent) but when added to the average unit procurement cost of ~$153 million, you get the $300+ million per figure.
Now, if the US were to build the originally planned 750 units, spreading this sunk cost across such a production number would end up being around $39 million per unit and the Unit Procurement Cost would drop down below $100 million a copy.
If a similar analysis is done for the JSF Program with its RDT&E budget expected to exceed $60 Bn, you can start to see why the claim of ‘affordability’ of the F-35 JSF is ‘a total indifference to reality’.
Risk based analysis shows that in 2014, the Unit Procurement Cost of the Block 3 F-35A JSF will likely be US$168 million (with a variance of -10% / +30%). This figure does not include any amortisation of the RDT&E costs.
What’s the value of posting articles written by anonymous authors which don’t cite supporting evidence? Why should this blog’s readers assume that the author of this article knows what they’re talking about, is independent and isn’t making stuff up?
NickD,
The author’s career and credentials have been verified. He was invited to write an article in ‘lay language.’ He will also tell visitors to this site who he is when he is ready to do that.
You raise a very important dilemma we all need to keep in mind. There is a value people may find in disclosure, in public life, in current affairs, or wherever, and there is also a value in the lives and careers of those who disclose.
What could be worse than significant errors in public policy or administration made in complete silence, with no debate, and no accountability?
Crikey hosts the highly entertaining ‘Pure Poison’ blog which takes bloggers to task for posting one-sided arguments or misinterpretations of data. At least Bolt, Blair and co are willing to put their names on the nonsense they publish.
I fail to see how this article (which, as a semi-informed layman, I found difficult to read) can contribute to policy debate given that no attempt has been made to establish its author’s credibility other than insisting that we take you at your word that they’re an “authoritative and experienced military identity” (whatever that means).
Peter, I read (lost the links due to a system switch) about how Oz chose making the Mustang here vs the Spitfire (just before the jet age swept everything away). It was a model of logic based on our unique requirements. Yes the Spit had better overall performance, but the Mustang’s range was such a critical requirement that it overshadowed the Spit’s better agility and climb.
They key was choosing what mattered for Oz, but it created problems. At the time Oz was still much more integrated into the UK defence systems (we did make Beaufighters and Mosquitos here as well). Our pilots were trained on Spits (etc). But that requirement overruled the other advantages. Admittedly we did pick and choose, taking a Mosquito and Mustang combination.
Using their logic and doing a thought experiment: it would be a straight comparison:
(1) SU-30 class. Examine in detail with western gadgets. How much, how long to integrate, basic performance. With the right deal then possible. If Putin offered us a servicing centre deal for SE Asia then the geo-stratgic advantages would be overwhelming (imagine if we get to service every SE Asian SU-30?).
(2) Eurofighter. Dismissed. Not because it is a bad plane, anything but, but it is a modern Spit (which should have been its name except for German sensitivity) which is perfect for the European situation. Though their Meteor missle is ideal for our requirements.
(3) F-35. Dismissed. It can’t defend Oz and that is the primary requirement. Basically (using the WW2 metaphore) it is a Kittyhawk, out performed by just about anything.
(4) F-22. Still debugging it, with some quite serious issues. We cannot afford a hanger queen, even ones that are fixable later, we don’t have that luxury, we need something that works now and is competitive for the next 10-15 years. It might be in the end (sticking to the WW2 metaphore) a P-38 (=a over complex failure). Or it might be the ‘Uber plane’ a Spit with long range. We can’t afford to take that chance. Plus the US, as it did with every other plane they have sold us, will neuter it .. even if they sold it to us anyway, which is doubtful, if the Israeli’s can’t get it then no one can. Double plus, if it can’t get into the air it is simply a target.
(5) F-15 upgraded. Ditto SU-30, with some serious advantages. Arguably 1st basic choice.
(6) F-18 ‘Super Hornet’. Not even on the list to be examined (sticking to the WW2 metaphore: a Defiant).
(7) Grippen. Vastly underrated, excellent package for a ‘high/low’ mix, some serious compatibilities with Oz’s unique needs. The Mossie to the Mustang. Cost of the mix is the issue. (but yes we can afford 2 plane types in appropriate numbers).
(8) Rafael, etc, similiar issue as the Eurofighter. Great for their needs but ours are different.
My feeling: they would negotiate hard with the US over the F-15 upgrade, Sweden over the Grippen, Russia with the SU-30. And the best deal would win (including offsets, maintenance, source software availability [a sticking point for the US but not an issue with Russia], etc).
On how the US treats Oz. I read (again lost the link) an article about how the US would not give us the software libraries for radar detectors for our F-111′s against F-16/18/15 etc.. Under Beazley we reverse engineered it and built our own. The article was written by the head of the dept that did it! So for nearly 20+ years our F-111′s were blind to any US built plane which were sold all over SE Asia then. Brilliant.
And that is a huge hole in Peter’s argument. If the US actually sold the F-22 to us .. which is so unlikely that I have better chance of winning Lotto .. then it would be so neutered (all that 2M lines of, to date, undebugged computer code).
So the ‘our’ F-22′s would be blind against a decrepit F-18 or F-16, ancient F-15 .. etc etc etc.
Tom,
You make some interesting points though on your suggestion that Su-30s are the solution, I refer you to my last on this matter.
As for the F-22 and the assertion “all that 2M lines of, to date, undebugged computer code”, this is simply incorrect. Might it be you be getting confused with the JSF software code problems as demonstrated by the USA/DAvis vs Lockheed Martin Qui Tam action? This risk was flagged back in 2003 and is now materialising.
You seem to forget that the USAF wanted Australia to consider the F-22 as a contender under Air 6000 . . . but CAF shut this down in 2001, prefering to nail his colours to the JSF mast.
The way to treat the risk that you perceive in relation to the pedigree (and configuration) of Australian F-22s is straightforward and commercial. With 55+ F-22 aircraft, Australia, firstly, would have over 20% of the world fleet – a position Australia has never held before with defence capability, and, secondly, instead of being one of the also rans with eight other nations, holding a seat on a subsidiary company worth less than 3% of the total JSF holding, Australia would have one of two (possibly 3) seats at the Holding Company level of the F-22 Program.
A rather exclusive club, wouldn’t you say?
Don’t you find it somewhat intriguing, if not bizarre, that 55 x F-22s would cost somewhat less than half what 100 x F-35s will cost in 2014 dollars?
Would this not make more sense, given the increasing shortfall in the number of fighter pilots we have versus the number of aircraft and the fact that the F-22 is around 3 times more capable than the F-35A will ever be and has the growth margins in its design that are suitable for the maintenance of this advantage through its life cycle?
Quote: “Would this not make more sense, given the increasing shortfall in the number of fighter pilots we have versus the number of aircraft and the fact that the F-22 is around 3 times more capable than the F-35A will ever be and has the growth margins in its design that are suitable for the maintenance of this advantage through its life cycle?”
I’m sure X Wing fighters would provide us with the ‘capability margin” we require too. Alas, just like the F-22A, they are unavailable…
Why do you continue with this obsessive, circular discussion Mr Goon? The F-22 wasn’t available 9 years ago, when you began publicly arguing for it and absolutely NOTHING has changed with regard to it’s availability for Australia or anyone else for that matter, in that time.
The Obey Amendment which you confidently predicted would be amended/repealed has NOT been and is in fact less likely than ever to be changed, given the Democratic President and Congress, both of whom want to see the end of the F-22 issue, once the 187 contracted aircraft are delivered.
This argument of yours is starting to look rather like a person standing on a jetty looking wistfully at a boat that has long sailed, I’m afraid….
Actally Jason, Peter makes some logical sense in the argument, but it all hinges on how good the F-22 really is. This means total dimensions:
(1) Performance that meets Oz’s, in many ways, unique requirements.
(2) Purchase cost.
(3) Maintenance cost.
(4) Uptime – how many in the air can you put at one time and how long for.
(5) Flexibility and growth potential.
Now of you believe the PR stuff then the F-22 is the bees knees, does everything but make the pilot tea while massaging his feet while he kills 300 planes.
But some data points plus the, now old, ‘Fighter Mafia’ (the Boyd crowd including F-16, A-10 designers) are critical of the F-22 (though they are scathing of the F-35).
Me I come from a skeptical point of view (duh). Would 55 F-22 meet our needs. If it is really as good as is claimed then .. yes.
But if there is a reasonable doubt then Oz needs to be careful because, unlike the US, we cannot afford a failure (they still have squillions of F-16′s, F-15′s, etc .. we would have nothing).
So my position is simple, bet on something that works .. and that does not include the F-22, F-35 or F-18.
Now the real situation is that we can have equivalent planes as our neighbours, but we can afford far more and train our pilots better and have better ‘add-on’ kit.
The old saying ‘quantity has its own quality’.
This is a thought experiment:
Indonesia buys (say) 50 SU-30′s. We can afford 150 of them (or equivalent) , and a more advanced model with with better electronics and far, far better pilot training, weapons, and support systems. Result: air strategic balance so much in our favour it is not funny. Plus they know it.
Now take the same scenario: Indonesia buys (say) 50 SU-30′s. We buy 55 F-22′s. It goes a little pear shaped and the F-22′s uptime declines badly. We can put (say) 25 in the air one time for a little while .. this gets ugly. Plus with such poor availability pilot training declines (if you can’t fly you can’t train).
Strategic balance is actually not so good, even though each individual plane is quite superior, though hampered by poorer pilot training.
Note the pilot training issue is a real issue, it has declined markedly in the USAF over the last 10 or so years. And F-22 training is equivalent to the WW2 cannon fodder levels.
Using the WW2 metaphore again, an idiot in a Me-262 was easy meat for an expert in a Tempest.
Plus Oz will never have impact on the US poltical/defense establishment, even if we bought 100, or even 200 F-22′s. Basic US politics and if you study US politics then it is pretty obvious (OZ Who????). Like the radar detectors for our F-111′s .. THEY NEVER GAVE US THE CODE’s for US planes .. EVER. We had to reverse engineer it and do it ourself. EVEN THOUGH WE WERE THE ONLY OTHER COUNTRY IN THE WORLD TO BUY F-111′S. Sorry Peter having a large share gives us no leverage at all there.
Sorry for shouting, but the US, if it ever thinks of us is at all, sees us a security risk, an irrelevance or a good place to test U-138 weapons (because they are not allowed to do that any longer in the US). We have precisely ZERO political clout there. Plus they have made it clear many times, just recently in East Timor as I remember, if push comes to shove against Indonesia .. they will back Indonesia or, at best, stay neutral.
So F-22′s are too big a risk for us
1. The case for NOT buying SU-30′s is about the only thing I agree with Mr Goon, about. The reason is because they are utter hangar-queens, with vastly overrated capability. The Russian solution to meeting Malaysia’s requirements for F/A-18D reliability levels is to propose to supply twice as many parts as the F/A-18D requires. Twice as many engines, etc. SU-30′s are cheap you say? They are cheap up front maybe, but it’s the devil in the detail that matters and their support costs and availability rates are atrocious.
2. RAAF could not man a force of 150x fighter aircraft no matter the type. A twin seat aircraft would simply exacerbate the issue.
3. There is no such thing as a free lunch. Either you want quality western avionics, sensors and weapon systems or you don’t. Malaysia is finding out the hard way, just what a pain in the rear end it is to attempt to integrate western avionics onto a Russian fighter, with their program not proceeding at all well. They are also finding our just how poor Russia is at supporting it’s products. It is noteworthy that RMAF are also currently retiring their MiG-29′s from service, despite being of the same vintage as their F/A-18D aircraft which they ARE keeping, the supposedly outclassed ones you’ll note and as late as the end of 2006, the Chief of RMAF admitted publicly that they would have chosen Super Hornets, instead of SU-30MKM’s, had the additional funds required, been available.
Australia should attempt a more advanced program even than this? What happened last time we tried to do something similar to that? Oh, yeah, I think it was called the Seasprite. Worked out great, didn’t it? Cheap an SU-30 may be, off the shelf. Go adding your favourite western avionics and sensor systems (APG-77, Sniper XR or whatever) and your bargain prices won’t remain there. Especially when YOU have to bear the costs of these orphan aircraft. The same issue killed the F-111S/F-111 “missileer” ideas, but Mr Goon can no doubt expand upon this…
As to America’s support during Interfet, I’m not sure if your recollection is all that accurate. I distinctly recall there being USMC operators on the ground in Dili in November 1999 onwards supporting Interfet. There were USAF C-17′s providing logistical support for ADF “behind the scenes” and there was an entire USMC MEU (Marine Expeditionary Unit) sitting off the coast of Timor, on standby in case things went pear-shaped. The Americans also provided significant Comms capabilities that we simply did not have and most definitely willing and able to assist if push had come to shove.
Thankfully it did not, but to argue they “abandoned us” is simply wrong. They provided a significant number of enabling assets we did not possess, that allowed us to undertake the operation and whatever you and Mr Goon might wish about the F-111′s and F/A-18′s etc that were based at RAAF Darwin during the early stages, it was the presence of the USMC that provided the true “big stick” that convinced the Indonesians not to try any harder to stop Interfet.
As to the “which aircraft” debate, I find it rather amusing that people won’t accept reality.
Come 2012 RAAF will be equipped with F/A-18A/B Hornets and F/A-18F Super Hornets in it’s Air Combat Group.
Come 2020 RAAF will be equipped with F/A-18F Super Hornets and F-35 Lightning II’s.
Come 2025 RAAF will be equipped with F-35 Lightning II’s.
Both sides of Parliament have committed to these aircraft and Defence won’t be getting any other manned tactical fighter. Period.
But please, continue to argue T:W, wing-loading and takeoff weights etc. Draw a few more wire diagrams and tell people you can infer what the RCS of a particular aircraft will be, etc. Explain Groupthink, impugn the reputation and competence of current serving officers and throw out terms such as CAIV as much as you like.
It is all SO relevant…
F-22, right it is now finally dead. Interestingly some back comments are that more F-18 Growlers (one of which ‘shot down’ a F-22 in an exercise) were preferred by the DOD and this played a part in neutralising Congressional support in some areas to continue at least some F-22 production.
I did a bit more research on the F-22 and the picture is ugly, just relying on US GAO reports about servicibility alone is scary. The bit about the main proccessor used (Intel i960) being out of production … well say no more. Plus serious problems with cracking, corrosion and major issues with the radar absorbing coatings, filling,etc. And this is a brand new plane that has taken 30 years to bring to fruition?
The coatings/fillings are actually now a court case against LM, due to a whistleblower taking action because they knowingly used inferior materials against his advice (and he is an expert). Note it is true that the majority of stealth comes from shape but fillings are essential to create that shape, otherwise straight lines and gaps appear which are death to stealth.
Fortunately it is off the plate. Though in passing, it made the early SU-27/30 class look wonderful in terms of servicability (the newer ones are supposed to be better though not nearly as good as the best western ones such as the F-18 and F-16 which have excellent reliability with the F-15 trailing a bit).
But sadly Peter is perfectly right about the F-35. It has many, possibly more in the future, issues with reliability. Its performance is, at best, poor in all spectrums (which was the saving grace of the F-22, if you could get it in the air it actually went very well in BVR and well, though with some limitations, in WVR).
But my argument is to take a leaf out of the past, lets have a true competition with no holds barred. We set our specifications out (including access to source code) are we arrange genuine flyoffs. We get some demonstrators and use them. We go over the maintenance, parts, logistics, etc, etc issues. Plus price, technology offsets, etc. And interoperability as well, though it should not be the dominant factor, just one of many important measures (after all how many more wars do we need to go to elsewhere).
Then on the merits, and the merits only, that is what we buy. If the EF pullls it off then so be it. If it is the upgraded F-15 (or rumoured F-16) then so be it. Or even a SU-30MKA, Raphael, Grippen, etc then again so be it. Heck the real answer may be not be any of the commonly quoted ones, or it could be some combination. no one has ever thought of to date.
If it (or a combination) is proved and tested objectively to meet our, in many ways unique, requirements than that is what we should choose. Plus the competition will get us the very best price, watch them all cut themselves to death to get the order.
Then again if nothing meets our needs then we can still dust off the old Mosquito production lines
Jason, I’m referring to before Interfet, when it got pretty ugly there for a while.
Yes, there some (greatly appreciated) behind the scenes support from the US (and genuinely thanks, as did the UK in the Falklands, that time some great US guys sacrificed their careers to help them).
But at the beginning officially, pre Interfet, there was not much (nothing actually), despite calls for assistance.
Look this is not a criticism of the septics, then have their own interests to look after. Rather a criticism of us, always looking for a ‘big brother’ to help us out. My position is that we have to look after ourself (in that I’m very much a ‘hawk’ on Oz defence and I agree with Peter, et al, that we need to spend more, though not rediculous levels). Frankly there will be times when our national interests will conflict with the US (duh).
Plus, our national interest means that we need to have alliances that may run contrary to US wishes, China obviously comes to mind.
Plus, and let’s be realistic about this, does anyone here seriously really think the US is still going to be the dominant economic and military force in SE Asia in 10 years?
And Jason, F-35 .. any bets when that program will be cancelled?
My prediction is within the next 2 years. The US economy is tanking, as are the Europeans. Already the Swedes, French, Russians and the ‘other’ US manufacturers are circling around offering cheaper and better alternatives. Upgraded F-15, F-16, F-18, SU-30+, Grippen, the Eurofighter consotium the list is endless (plus a rumoured upgraded Harrier).
Really, as the cost of the F-35 goes through the roof and the performance keeps degrading what do you really expect Govt’s to do? Oh then again going by previous history Oz will be the only country to buy them .. and then spend 20 years trying to get some life out of them. At the current rate of cost escalation we will be able to afford about 10 of them.
It is the F-111 again, the do everything plane. Fighter, fighter bomber, Mach 2.5, bomber, carrier aircraft .. it ended up as a sub-sonic bomber that can only exist by flying 5 feet above the ground at about 300+knots and no one in their right mind uses, even the Israeli’s who get all their planes for free. The TSR-2 was much better and Barnes Wallice was dead right (basically he looked at the design and went “dear God this is rubbish”).
So prediction .. we won’t have any F-35′s, or we will be the only country that does and have 10 (and no one in the US buys it either). Oh well they might actualy turn the F-18 into something reasonable (and pigs might fly). Then again Oz has gone through long periods with rubbish and not been attacked .. we might be lucky again.
Well Britain has already ordered 3x F-35B LRIP aircraft, so your first prediction is wrong, I’m afraid, Tom…
As to so-called “better” alternatives, I truly wonder what they are.
There is precisely one 5th generation fighter aircraft that Australia can conceivably purchase. F-22 being killed, seemingly for good this time, by the US Senate today, so that is no longer worth even debating.
A 4th Gen Euro-canard or US teen fighter? This means no VLO capability whatsoever is available for RAAF. Whatever you like to imagine the VLO level of the F-35 to be, it at the very least several orders of magnitude beyond any achievable RCS reductions available on legacy aircraft. Even Boeing were grudgingly forced to admit this, when discussing their “Silent Eagle” proposal and on top of this, no F-35 equals no internal weapons carriage and whatever available performance might exist on a clean airframe will therefore be hindered by parasitic drag.
Now Mr Goon has written this previously about the F-35′s performance, “Even at a MTOW of 60,000 lbs, none of the three JSF model designs present with an aircraft that is able to take off with full internal fuel and its full external payload, let alone internal and external payloads, together.” In his “Biggest Loser” article dated 16 April 2007 and yet L-M has SHOWN us the non-SWAT optimised AA-1 model F-35 flying with representative “maximum” internal stores (2x 2000lbs JDAM and 2x AMRAAM) and according to the test pilot, a full internal fuel load.
The photos are all over the place, here being such a one:
http://www.jsf.mil/images/gallery/sdd/f35_test/a/sdd_f35testa_070.jpg
They could not have demonstrated how this claim could be any more wrong in ANY clearer fashion whatsoever at this stage of the flight test program.
Mr Goon has also commented on the STOVL weight, describing it rather negatively, particularly with regard to “bring back margin” and yet the thrust BF-1 has demonstrated on the hover pit, that it comfortably exceeds it’s KPP in this area, ie: more thrust and lift was generated than expected.
These are glaring examples of just how wrong assumptions made on the basis of available open sourced literature can be.
I for one am do not at all subscribe to the notion that the F-35 or F/A-18F aircraft will be outclassed within our region by ANY aircraft our “regional neighbours” might be acquiring.
Claims of the scary “SU-35″ are curious in that there are precisely 2 airframes flying, the other crashed rather spectacularly a few months back, and no production orders whatsoever have been placed for the aircraft, at this stage it is nothing more than the latest addition to the long line of unsuccessful technology demonstrators (MiG 1.44, SU-37 etc) that Russia has wheeled out over the years and then failed to develop further.
My prediction is that come 2020, Australia will have 3x squadrons of F-35A in-service with 2 OCU, 3 Sqn, 75 Sqn and 77 Sqn. Australia’s fleet will be a part of a worldwide fleet of no less than 1000 aircraft (at that time) and eventually part of a fleet exceeding 2000 airframes.
Come 2025 we’ll have 1 and 6 Sqn’s kitted out with them too.
No other platform on Earth, gives us a hope of achieving as much.