If it hasn’t already happened, there needs to be some serious questions asked by Senator John Faulkner, Defence Minister of those who scripted his recent enthusiastic endorsement of the JSF or Joint Strike Fighter.
Faulkner is no fool, and it very unlikely he will tolerate being made to look as captured by the rhetoric associated with this program as the words provided for him in his press releases earlier this year on this project imply.
The notes that will give the Minister, and anyone else on the government and opposition benches cause for concern are found in the just revealed report to Congress by Mike Gilmore, the US Director of Operational Test & Evaluation concerning the JSF project in 2009.
This has been provided to us by Dr Carlo Kopp, defence analyst, at Air Power Australia. The interest for Plane Talking is in the extremely serious political and strategic consequences that would result from this program failing.
Kopp says:
This is the strongest language seen in any DOT&E report – far more critical than widely publicised OT&E criticisms of the Super Hornet some years ago, which many may recall.
This is evidence of pervasive and systemic failure in basic design of the airframe and systems. Every single problem or area of difficulty has been previously identified by APA, and far too frequently not believed, or dismissed.
What is abundantly clear is that the JSF is the least survivable new US combat aircraft design seen for many decades. Not only, as APA has proven many times over, is it easy to engage and hit, but as the DOT&E report shows abundantly, it is highly vulnerable and easy to kill if it is hit.
What the Director of OT&E has said in this 2009 report about the JSF Program bears all the hallmarks of an aircraft that has been designed by committees dominated by people other than professional Aerospace and Systems Engineers with currency and credence in the design, operation and effective management of the development of air combat fighter aircraft.
Even the simulation and modelling tools, that are intended to support testing, will only have “. . .50 per cent of the models will be accredited”, and this will not be achieved till “. . . during the final year of flight test, an approach with substantial risk”. Flying blind, in other words.
And, then, of course there are the considerable risks, issues and concerns about the autonomic logistics global sustainment (ALGS) system as recently put by APA to Australia’s DoD.
As if there isn’t enough to consider that warrants a complete re-assessment of Australia’s continued involvement in the JSF Program, the contents of this report, alone, should make this the highest imperative of the Australian Department of Defence Capability Acquisition Program and its related steering committees.
Clearly, the Air Combat Capability Review done in early 2008 by Mr Neil Orme failed to adequately consider, let alone address, the quite substantial and substantive risks and supporting analyses provided by APA and many other experts.
Any doubt as to the veracity of this observation can be readily dispelled by comparing the ACCR / Orme Report with the submissions provided, and this latest report from the US Director of OT&E.
The considerations and concerns listed in this DOT&E report are but a small number of those provided to Mr Neil Orme, some two years and many Australian tax payer dollars ago; not to mention the capability and Industry opportunity costs.
What is an unavoidable observation at this point in time, is that all of APA’s biggest concerns about this dysfunctional program were not only warranted, the reality is worse than APA predicted.
Here are some of the highlighted sections in clearer resolution.
The report says that “in 55 total flights during the fiscal year the integrated test force resolved a total of seven mission system success criteria of the 284 allotted to the CATB.
The report says, “The program needs to protect against the tendency to use models before they are ready.
“The impact of not doing so will be to create more risk of discovery of deficiencies during flight test, which the reliance on models was intended to avoid….
“Expectations of capabilities in early lots…of aircraft need to be adjusted to the realities of what can be developed and verified before delivery.”
The non-performance of this project last year could not have been unknown to those responsible for the defence materiels organisation. What exactly did our defence people do on their hosted trips to the US. How much of what they are paid to know did they faithfully and accurately convey to the minister.
Where is this tragic screw up leading us?
Some notes from Lockheed Martin concerning our notes.
Statement for DOT&E Report:
The report covers Fiscal Year 2009 and does not reflect progress that has been made recently. Although late deliveries of aircraft from production to flight test have impacted early test results, the program has turned the corner of both production and test and verification and we fully expect to complete developmental testing in the prescribed time frame (2014).
Fifteen of the 19 SDD aircraft have been delivered including six ground test articles and nine fliers. The remainder will be delivered in 2010.
Four of the 13 SDD flight test aircraft have flown (AA-1, BF-1, BF-2, and AF-1). The next aircraft to fly is BF-3, our third STOVL aircraft, early this year. We have flown about 140 times, which is below plan, but early flight test results are encouraging. According to the story, the DOT&E report goes through FY09 and counts 16 flights. As of today that number is 49, not counting AA-1 flights. None of AA-1′s 91 flights appear to be included in the DOT&E info that Bloomberg discusses.
Software is approximately 80% complete. Software stability and reliability is about 20 times greater than the F-22 program at this stage in the program.
We have an excellent airframe design with the first ground-test article, STOVL BG-1, recently having completed its testing ahead of schedule, with more than 200 test points. AG-1, CTOL variant, is ahead of this pace completing full airframe tests (13.5 Gs) with no failures.
Not reflected in the DOT&E report are recent significant accomplishments:
First Flight of the optimized CTOL variant on 11/14/09
The ferry of the first of the first STOVL aircraft to PAX River on 11/15/09 and subsequent ferry of BF-2 on 12/29/09.
Finally, and probably most significantly we engaged BF-1s STOVL propulsion system in flight on two different sorties for the first time in January. The successful tests are the first in a series of planned STOVL-mode flights that will include short takeoffs, hovers and vertical landings.
Although the SDD aircraft have incurred delays in entering flight test for several reasons, there are important technical achievements that have been demonstrated to date which are significantly more advanced than in any legacy program:
o Exceptional static testing results on the STOVL and CTOL variants (full envelope verification in half the time of legacy) with CV variant ground testing scheduled to start this month.
o Exceptional software stability demonstrated in our ground and flying laboratories and now undergoing initial F-35 mission system tests, compared to legacy platforms.
o Exceptional sensor performance on surrogate airborne test platforms.
o Exceptional signature test results, both near and far field coupled with robust, supportable Low Observeability characteristics.
Each of these technical accomplishments reflects soundness in the underlying engineering design and indicates a level of confidence entering flight test that has not been experienced on previous programs.
The flight test program is structured around conservative factors related to refly and regression testing and we believe we will be able to progress faster than legacy programs based on the extensive investment in integrated laboratories, flying test beds and modeling and simulation capabilities.
30 Comments
This revelation on a committee designed aircraft appears to have all the hallmarks of producing a doomed lemon. Unfortunately for Australia our inept Defense Department has a track record of purchasing lemons and this may be an opportune time for Defense Minister Senator John Faulkner to show his metal and take on the military boffins over the current foolhardy JSF order commitments.
The highlighted parts about the STOVL variant and F-35C are both irrelevant to Australia, as we are not purchasing those models.
The report covers ALL versions and besides, if two of the three models fail then why would the US continue the program when they have a superior aircraft they can use currently in production (F-22)? They wont. The USN doesn’t even want the C version. If the B & C models fail it will still end the program.
JSF partners wanted to buy all versions. Are they likely to stay on if they cant get what they wanted? Doubt it. Their lost sales is only going to push up the price for us. Lets reach for the ejection handles on this farce now.
This was done to death before the election. The super hornets and the JSF were always the bad options. We made enquiry of the F22 but that went quiet.
The thing is when we get these things, if every, we will be out gunned in the air by most of our neighbours who are into the later Russian variants. This was pretty much known a few years ago. It was surprising we ordered the Super Hornets and stuck with the JSF. NObody can logically explain why we are going for this stuff. But I remember Nelson confirming the Hornet purchase a few days after Cheney saw him.
The current chief of the defence force, Air Marshall Houston, is not a fighter pilot or an engineer but a helicopter pilot. It is a matter of public record that he is aware of the objections of the RAAF fighter pilots and engineers, but he disagrees with them.
It is also a matter of public record that he considers that the manned fighter will become obsolete shortly. This is not a likelihood in his view, but a reasonable certainty.
From an engineering point of view, it will not be for many years and pending some major technological innovations that an affordable remote-controlled combat aircraft could be designed to be more potent in combat that a manned fighter at ranges beyond line-of-sight. The controller on the ground has to be able to see what is happening around the remote-controlled aircraft in enough detail to make real-time combat decisions from his/her station many hundreds of kilometres away. To communicate enough information from the air vehicle to the controller on the ground using current technology is around 10 megabits per second, perhaps more. That ties down around a third of a $US250million communications satellite; clearly not affordable. Of course this also assumes that the enemy cannot jam the satellite, destroy the satellite or destroy the ground station housing the controller.
In any case such a remote-controlled aircraft has never been built or even designed. Of course once it is designed (somehow) it then needs to be manufactured, deployed and its ground crews and ‘aircrews’ need to be trained. This capability should not be assumed for any particular date in the future.
I don’t think that the Department of Defence will advise the Minister to change his policy on this because they think that useable and affordable remote-controlled fighters will become available in the reasonably short term. Pilots and Engineers are not respected in today’s DoD. Shades of today’s airlines.
Perhaps we need to get Air Marshall Houston to read his history, specifically the British Navy and the Falklands war. The poms were sure that missiles would protect ships from aircraft and that their navy had no need for carriers. They were in the process of scrapping them all when the Argentines invaded the Falklands.
Suddenly, the missiles weren’t working as predicted (freezing in their launchers due to the extreme cold, not locking on, etc) and the benefits of a carrier & its aircraft were forcibly made clear to the bureaucrats & senior officers with more braid than brains.
Sure, unmanned air combat vehicles are happening now and developments are very likely to produce fully computerised fighter aircraft (with a human monitoring, not controlling). To expect this to be perfected and working well within 20-30 years, however, is crazy.
This whole situation stinks of the same “don’t rock the boat, protect your job & keep paying the mortgage/kids school fees/etc” rot that has led to project disasters like Telstra’s IT Transformation and Boeing’s 787. Senior execs/officers believe the vendor waffle and ignore their own tech specialists because they’re “old school & don’t get the new ways” and don’t get that “this project will be different.”
America has lost its way with the JSF and led a number of its friends down the same path – the JSF (a.k.a. just so flawed) Program’s yellow brick road.
Does this sound familiar to not so distant happenings that have their 3 letter abbreviations seared into our brains, e.g. GFC, AIG, HiH and Enron (okay, there is an exception to every rule!).
Here is another – Bernie Madoff and Wall Street.
And then there is the muther of all – WGT – the western global tri-pandemic: the three organisational social diseases that are at the root of all of the above.
These diseases and their symptoms or traits have many names and come in many shapes and sizes and colours, under the titles of:
(1) Group Think – the worst being of the institutionalised variety.
(2) The artistry of ‘a total indifference to reality’ a.k.a. bullsh*t
(3) Rentseeker behaviour
All have something in common as one of their principal drivers – WIFM.
All require a high level of self deception to be work and be effective.
However, when shared with others:
self deception = deception.
If you want to see how this has worked for the JSF Program, take a look at:
http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-NOTAM-081109-1.html
and
http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-NOTAM-191109-1.html
If you want to see where the JSF went off the rails, technically, you don’t have to go far beyond the US Marine Corps’ driving, wanton desire to fly vertically.
Amongst others, this locked in the requirements for and the consequences of:
- single engine
- small planform
- the type of wing form
- long wheelbase, wide track undercarriage
- small, funny shaped, canted weapon bays
- overly complex emergency egress system
- high weight
- mediocre aerodynamic and kinematic performance
- the STOVL weight attack team (SWAT) activities back in 2004 which sealed the fate of any commonality in airframes
Who would have thunk it!
Well, some people did – http://www.ausairpower.net
Herewith some edited extracts from BOYD – ‘The fighter pilot who changed the art of war’ by Robert Coram.
‘Early 1970s, there was abundant US media criticising the extraordinary expense of the F-15 and the abysmal performance of the F-14. Criticism of the 2 aircraft reached such a peak that SecDef Laird decided to whip the military purchasing system into shape, assigning the job to DepSec Packard. This action followed the Fitzhugh Commission appointed in 1969 to take a hard look at DoD management and the acquisition process.
Before WW2, most new fighters appeared first as prototypes. It made sense to test a design, decide whether it was good or bad, make modifications, redesign it and then put it on the production line. But defense contractors said the business had become too complex and too expensive to make prototypes and Air Force bureaucrats agreed as they did not want tests that might cancel their pet projects. SecDef McNamara played into their hands when he brought to the Pentagon something called ‘Total Package Procurement Concept’. He thought all the analysis and quantification could be done on paper.
The Fitzhugh group recommended when building new weapons systems, the DoD should develop and test a prototype before sending the weapons system into production. This is because in almost every instance, a defense contractor underestimates (front-loads) costs and overestimates performance. A prototype reveals design flaws, performance inadequacies and true costs. DepSec Packard approved the YF-16 lightweight fighter prototype program which the USAF was obliged to launch in December 1971.’
Colonel John Boyd’s YF-16 was the first US-designed single-engine agile pure fighter/interceptor since the F-86 Sabre. Not only was he going to develop an airplane that would be superior to the F-15, he would show the Pentagon a production process that would be as lean and mean as the lightweight fighter itself. But the USAF decided to shape the pure and nimble little fighter like ‘another goddamned gold-plated multi-mission aircraft’ lamented Boyd, apparently to ensure it would not outperform the pet F-15 in the air superiority role. Nonetheless, the F-16 design with superior fuel fraction still has great design growth potential to be optimized for particular roles and the production facilities are extant at Lockheed-Martin although presently subordinated to development of the F-35.
Multiple nations were bribed into subsidizing development of the conceptual F-35 involving some tentative commitments to purchase without the aircraft first being operationally proven. Nebulous downstream projections regarding capabilities and production have disrupted force structures planning worldwide and further slippage seems inevitable adding costs for prospective purchasers to maintain interim military capabilities (like $6billion plus for 24 Super Hornets for Australia).
Hitherto, Australia has more or less clamoured to be a launch customer in some dubious merit military hardware projects before the concepts have been operationally proven. This derives from support of uneconomic Australian defence science and industry being a major plank of defence policy attracting huge influence peddling from the major arms conglomerates now dominating the Australian scene directly employing many retired politicians, senior public servants, former senior military officers and some as highly paid lobbyists.
Wedgetail is a classic example of an inadequately proven concept being introduced into service; also prohibitively costly Tiger and MRH-90 helicopters which will both prove to be operationally deficient and not cost-effective for regional operations. Neither helo was subjected to thorough tropical trialling before acquisition was decided.
It would be a lot smarter to be a decade or 2 behind the pack regarding leading edge technology to ensure functional military hardware is acquired. Despite not having the low observable characteristics of the unavailable F-22 or the hitherto unproven F-35, new well-proven F-16s (optimized as appropriate) would arguably be adequate and more affordable for Australia’s regional air superiority needs, perhaps to around Year 2030. Billions of Australian taxpayer dollars could probably be saved via a foreign military sales deal offloading all RAAF Hornets and Super Hornets to the airframe deficient US Navy as trade-in on an appropriate number of optimized new F-16s in lieu of the still somewhat mythical F-35.
Consider this statement from Lockheed Martin: ‘Nations who operate and will operate the F-16 have made an important commitment to its citizens: national defense. To that end, no other fighter can match the F-16’s record . . . because no other fighter comes close to offering all its strengths.’
I see Ben has posted the LM response to the DOT&E report under the heading:
“Some notes from Lockheed Martin concerning our notes” (above)
Notwithstanding this would have to be the first aircraft development program, ever, to declare so stridently that a ‘ferry flight’ is some sort of “significant accomplishment”, these notes from LM’s spind doctors are simple ‘misdirection’ of the less than masterful variety. They are replete with all the same old sophistry, spin, self deceit and logicals fallacies seen before, including that hoary old chestnut of claiming the just so flawed JSF Program to be “significantly more advanced than in any legacy program”.
And if this program turns any more corners, it will end up back where it started.
Now, for those who are competitive by nature and like a challenge, there is a gift of a dozen (12) bottles of 2005 vintage Penfolds Bin 128 Coonawarra Shiraz for the first individual to post the full, complete list of misdirecting spin, sophistry and logical fallacies contained in these notes with explanations at to how each meets the criteria of the relevant category (the definitions for each category may be found on Wikipedia).
This challenge is intended for individual posters but is open to all. However, team efforts or tagging, though they may be quite entertaining, will not be eligible to receive the gift.
The judge’s decision is final and only humourously entertaining correspondence may be entered into.
Bonus points will be given for posts that include supporting data and facts or other such evidence.
Bushranger, the F-16 hasn’t nearly enough range or versatility for Australia.
I would have thought that the korean F-15K would have been the perfect fit for Australia, or more speculatively the F-15SE. An order for 150 of them would have made Boeing happy, would have confirmed their future. Far cheaper for us, able to be delivered in a few years (available now!), offering everything the F-35 had and more.
The F-16? Well, finally we see an APA member actually come up with a positive idea. I don’t agree with it myself (why acquire a less capable fighter than the Super Hornets we already have?) but at least it’s a step in the right direction…
Mr Goon or Horde, if he prefers, on the other hand does not at all seem interested in posting anything positive. F-22 is no longer available and will be out of production by 2011 and yet still we see nothing but criticism from him and his partner in “crime”.
The F-22 isn’t available and RAAF will NEVER operate a Chinese or Russian fighter aircraft, so we therefore the ONLY choices available for a new tactical fighter for RAAF in the next 10 years are: 1. JSF. 2. Super Hornet. 3. An evolved F-16 variant. 4. An evolved F-15 variant. 5. The Eurofighter Typhoon. 6. Rafale and 7. Gripen.
So, which is it to be Mr Goon? There are only 7 available fighter aircraft types to choose from.
Wilful, except low observability, an internal payload capability, internal sensors and a 360 degree EO/IR system, I agree. An evolved F-15 variant would have provided an excellent F-111 replacement. Whether we would want an entire fleet comprised soley of the F-15 though is a significant question.
Can you name a single operator that flies the F-15 as it’s sole air combat type? That sole question says something about the validity of the idea to me…
Fueldrum, I’m not quite sure what you are insinuating with respect to ACM Houston. You state “he” is a “helicopter pilot” as if this equates to him being unable to understand the recommendations passed to him by the head of Capability Development Group, Chief of RAAF (AM Mark Binskin who I understand has some small experience with fighter aircraft…) and other relevant “stakeholders”.
Is this what you are implying? That a mere “helicopter pilot” is unable to comprehend what a “fighter pilot” can? This seems like a rather weak argument to me…
Especially when ACM Houston is a QFI and did tours on Macchi’s and BAC Strikemasters as well as his Iroquois experience…
Hi Wilful. Quite a few variables when you talk about range and combat radius. F-16 versions can ferry without in-flight refuelling at least 10 percent further than Hornet and maybe beyond 15 percent further than Super Hornet. Consider the fuel fractions meaning weight of internal fuel as as a percentage of max clean take-off weight and number of engines.
Versatility? The F-16 isarguably the most versatile combat bird in worldwide service and still has great design growth potential for optimization. Consider what the Israelis have done.
Hello Jason. You seem a bit off track re APA. Air Power Australia has 2 principals/founders, Peter Goon and Dr. Carlo Kopp. There is no membership as such that I am aware of and they sometimes form consultative groups from people around the world to address particular issues. I was invited to be involved regarding submissions to the Air Combat Capability Review.
Their comprehensive website embraces an abundance of military technical material that mostly cannot easily be publicly accessed elsewhere so it has become recognized worldwide as an invaluable research source as evidenced by the huge visitation statistics. I dare say the facility is of value to you guys in defence as an adjunct to other material you can source.
While I might not personally agree with all of the contentions proffered in APA writings, they provide valuable references for analysis and to motivate further debate of defence related issues. Hitherto, there has seemingly not been adequate regard paid by politicians and defence entities to the invaluable expertise and combat experience available in the retired military community. If more wisdom was shown by Australian governments in this regard, at least some of the continuing succession of inappropriate acquisition projects might have been avoided.
Re helo pilots. Quite a few former RAAF fast jet pilots transitioned to helicopters and high numbers did the opposite during the 26 years that the Air Force operated battlefield helicopters.
Wilful, Jason; respectfully suggest you both visit http://www.f-16.net to appreciate the development potential of the F-16 and the capabilities of versions. Depending on how configured, these birds could ferry direct from Williamtown to Learmonth against mean prevailing westerly winds at altitude whereas the Super Hornet has shorter legs being much heavier with 2 engines and having to carry more fuel to burn more fuel to carry more fuel. Weapon payload of the F-16 is similar to Super Hornet with radius of action roughly comparable for like mission profiles.
So; why would the F-16 be better than the Super Hornet Jason? Its operating costs would be significantly lower due to its outstanding single engine performance. Overall ADF operating costs are off the clock now and will continue to escalate alarmingly as some of the poor choice acquisitions come on line.
The Super Hornet is comparatively an expensive bomb truck with less aerial combat capability and has virtually zip growth potential whereas some really interesting conceptual versions of the F-16 that have already been researched embrace low observable and thrust vectoring features. These could materialize if the JSF falls over.
Having already subsidized faltering development of the F-35, Australia would be in a very good position to force a good bargain on trade-in of the Hornets/Super Hornets for the US Navy and acquisition of suitable versions of the F-16, perhaps including some 2 seaters optimized for maritime strike.
Jason, I don’t thik you know anything about the F-15SE. Do a quick google, there’s a good chap…
Jason Simonds,
Air Marshall Houston’s views on this are, as I said, a matter of public record. He went on public record saying that fighter pilots will become obsolete. which implies that a superior alternative means of defending airspace will become available reasonably soon. This on-the-record statement from the Chief of the Defence Force would also explain why the fundamental weaknesses of the f-35 design for air-to-air combat don’t seem to matter to Air Marshall Houston.
These weaknesses, however, will actually be extremely important if UCAV technology doesn’t advance as quickly as Air Marshall Houston expects. If these technologies don’t advance as hoped, RAAF pilots may be sent into battle against Flanker pilots in the sea-air gap to Australia’s north. Against the Flanker they will fly into battle like the ANZACs and get slaughtered like the ANZACs
That should be of concern to us all.
Well Fueldrum, I see things just a tad differently from your viewpoint. First of all you make a very large assumption that RAAF pilots will ever be engaged by Sukhoi mounted pilots.
Second you make the assumption that an F-35 mounted pilot would be in an inferior combat aircraft to any known Sukhoi aircraft.
I do not intend to go into the tedious pi**ing contest of which aircraft has this thrust or that aircraft has that wing loading, because these things aren’t important in the overall scheme of things. What is important in combat is situational awareness and operating as a system. Manfred Von Richthofen understood that in 1915, but it’s amazing how many it escapes even today…
One other point about Von Richthofen. He had 80 formally accredited air to air combat victories in WW1, being the most successful individual pilot in the war. And he did it with generally inferior aircraft…
Even if the F-35 IS an inferior air combat aircraft to some other types, and I do not subscribe to this at all, your idea of hordes of RAAF pilots flying to their death in these “inferior” aircraft bears absolutely no resemblance to ACTUAL combat conditions.
It is the SYSTEM that counts, not an individual component. Few airforces have a SYSTEM that is qualitatively superior to that which RAAF has developed and is enhancing…
Wilful,
I am painfully aware of the F-15SE and Boeing’s rather futile attempt to market it at the present time. At best I see some elements of it’s design being incorporated by existing F-15 users in a SLEP. New orders? I don’t see a future for it I’m afraid.
Boeing’s rather more cautious promotion of the benefits of the”Silent Eagle” upgrade after their recent RCS test series, should give one pause before adopting the concept too wholeheartedly I should think. The aircraft is no longer considered, even by Boeing, going on it’s most recent public statements to match the RCS of the F-35 even in it’s sole competing area, the frontal sector…
Bushranger,
I agree the F-16 has been and remains an excellent fighter. I wonder though if it will be truly cost effective given the now sunk investment in RAAF’s Super Hornet fighter?
I cannot envisage how an investment of up to $4b, (not including the programmed funding for yearly support costs) much of which would be gone if we were to simply dump the fighter, can be forgone in order to acquire an even earlier generation design?
Whether you care for the merits of the design or not, the Super Hornet has a sound track record in US Navy service both on operations and in exercises, is spoken highly of, even by Dr Kopp as a slow speed “dogfighting” aircraft (and by more than a few current F-16 pilots as well) and has a very sound air to surface/maritime strike capability. At the very least, it’s a credible fighter, if not a truly excellent one and features outstanding radar, EW systems, EO/IR sensors, weapons and avionics systems, the match of anything currently available anywhere in the world.
As to room for growth, well I beg to differ here too. General Electric would be more than happy to sell the already developed enhanced performance engine variant of the F414 (F414 EPE), providing an extra 4000lbs of thrust per engine to a prospective customer, whilst Lockheed Martin would no doubt be pleased to sell pod mounted IRST systems to a Super Hornet customer and Boeing is very keen to develop a Block III variant to follow-on from it’s efforts with it’s Block II standard.
On top of which the planned weapons upgrades are extremely extensive (AIM-9X Block II, AIM-120D AMRAAM, Laser JDAM, JSOW-C1/2, SDBI/II, AARGM, JAGM etc) and there is always the option to pursue an EA-18G Growler capability, if a customer so chooses (and passes the infernal ITARS process).
A development path to Next Generation Jammer for the Growler has become more clear, with funding being announced over the last few days and this means the EA-18G will remain a unique capability amongst modern western fighter aircraft and one, unfortunately even the F-16 cannot manage for quite some time, if ever.
I don’t dispute that the F-16 is an excellent fighter. It has proven itself repeatedly and is still winning contracts, but I really wonder what it offers, that it’s contemporaries don’t, in a new-build aircraft acquisition?
Hello again Jason. Let’s think somewhat outside the Defence square.
Bets are firming that the JSF project might fall over. If that happens, it will be a huge political embarrassment for the US and nations including Australia who were silly enough to subsidize F-35 development. Some possible eventualities within the Lockheed Martin stable might then be resumption of previous development work on F-16 enhancements and even a US political turnabout on F-22 manufacture/export.
How then might Australia position to mitigate losses on an unwise investment? There is a window of opportunity to shed the Hornet/Super Hornet fleet to the airframe strapped US Navy while there is reasonable life remaining in the Hornets. If this were done expeditiously, Australia might get a pretty fat military sales credit on acquisition of whatever type(s) downstream; but if we were to hang on to the Hornet fleet much longer, they will only be worth scrap metal. If JSF founders, Australia would be in a very strong bargaining position with Lockheed Martin re possible F-35 substitution and this of course could bring F-16 versions into play – even the F-22 should not be discounted.
The Super Hornet is just not as air combat capable as the F-16 being more of a big heavy bomb truck and latest versions of both aircraft are pretty comparable in the strike roles, including maritime. There is of course a very big acquisition and operating cost penalty for the Super Hornet and the rapidly escalating funding of defence (which has alarmingly escalated from 7.6 percent to near 10 percent of federal government revenue in less than 2 years) will predictably have ramifications for both of the major political parties.
If the JSF project folds, it would be prudent for Australia to shed the Hornet/Super Hornet fleet pretty quickly to recover some financial loss and lease some suitable model F-16s while awaiting shakeout of the US politico/military scene. We did a similar very economical deal in leasing of 24 x F-4E while awaiting F-111 production problems to be resolved. Better to cash in while we can and then just sit on the fence as national intelligence assessments do not foresee our sovereignty threatened near term.
Defence White Paper 2009 is arguably the most ill-conceived policy document ever contrived and the military capabilities expansions envisaged therein will just not be economically affordable, nor is enlarged ADF manning realistic. So you Guys in Defence will have to begin thinking very seriously about cost saving measures which might involve reduction or even curtailment of some inappropriate hardware acquisitions.
Hi Bushranger,
Thanks for continuing the discussion. Nice to see an APA contributor actually willing to discussion options, as I said earlier.
The problems with removing the Super Hornet from RAAF service are manifold:
1. The acquisition is a “sunk” cost. The aircraft, simulators, other training equipment, test and support equipment and weapons and sensors for the aircraft HAVE been paid for. To attempt to “trade them in” would completely forgo this investment. The USN “might” be willing to accept them, but then again, maybe not. NZ has certainly found out it is not as easy to sell US fighters, back to the US as may be thought… Many of these costs can not be traded in” to the USN. They involve buildings, simulators and support facilities constructed by defence contractors that are not readily transferable between varying platforms.
Even if the USN agreed to take the platforms, we would certainly lose an enormous part of the investment, maybe as high as 30-40% of that initially made, with no return on our investment. Given the $4.5b up front price tag, that’s $1.5b – $1.8b down the drain with nothing to show for it and a need to spend another $4.5b to acquire the capability. Add this to the Seasprite debacle and we would have then spent $3b on defence procurement with no result to be had. Hardly a responsible fiscal policy…
2. Local industry has geared up to transition from support of the F-111 to supporting the Super Hornet. It is a massive effort to change from one combat aircraft type to another, as I’m sure you agree, no matter the type. To ask local industry to change to yet another type so quickly, is asking for an enormous bill. Mr Goon I’m certain can expand on the difficulties local contractors have with planning to support defence. To expect them to foot the bill is too much. Ask any contractor what their primary requirement from Defence as a customer is and I am certain they will answer: “stability”. Chopping and changing defence capability is not a practice most in industry desire to be involved with.
As an example, Tasman Aviation Enterprises has just finished upgrading their capabilities to support the F414 engine system, once their TF-30 work runs out. They have the current F-111 engine contract and based on their performance and expertise have been selected to support the Super Hornet’s F414. They’ve spent millions preparing for the Super Hornet and are the only organisation in Australia that can do so. Do you expect them to simply forgo all that effort and cost and convert to supporting the F-16, just because in a clean airframe condition it is kinematically superior to the Super Hornet by a few percentage points? I can tell you right now they won’t. They’ll howl to the skies and so would the wider media and public. They would be absolutely correct to do so, too.
As to logistical support costs, that is a curious argument given the money has already been provided to RAAF by Government to operate the SHornet capability for the next 13 years. This is why the aircraft had such a hideously large price tag and is a very interesting development, that seems to be catching on. The earlier process was to simply announce the much lower “upfront” cost and “hide” the support costs year to year. I find it rather refreshing that the support costs for the expected (at this time) life of the capability has been announced. I wonder if the UAE and it’s Block 60 F-16 capability took this approach, seeing as though you seem to favour an aircraft rather like that. I VERY much doubt they did and would be interested to see what THEIR real costs for maintaining their aircraft are. I personally think the figure might be rather shocking to most, (accepting of course that the figure is NOT shocking if one has the wherewithal and political will to actually pay it.)
The F-16 Block 60+ “might” be a bit cheaper to run, though not significantly in my opinion, because whilst it only has one engine, it has a big powerful one and the F414 is noted for it’s reliability and cost effectiveness. (Note this engine was chosen by SAAB for it’s Gripen NG upgrade over domestically modified and produced RM-12 engines and the EJ-200 “Eurofighter” engine).
As to F-22, that is a dead horse, that I am surprised you are continuing to flog. It won’t be in production come 2012, both the current US President, Sec Def and Congress want it capped at 187. It still effectively can NOT be exported under American law and despite protestations to the contrary from Messirs Goon and Kopp, this status has not changed in the last 10 years and won’t in the next 10 either. RAAF pilots might want it, but RAAF does NOT want it. The Australian Government, ESPECIALLY with Senator Faulkner as Defmin has heard ALL of these arguments many times over and does not want the thing either. The argument is over, but you guys can’t seem to understand this…
As to Defence costs rising, this has been considerably addressed by Government, with a significant restriction placed on Defence funding. SRP is forcing defence to tighten it’s belt in massive ways, most of which will never be seen by the public. ANY currently un-funded capability acquisitions are being pushed WAY back by the current Government, (you may have noticed that the large F-35 order ((up to 58x aircraft)) has been pushed back 2 years), so if you honestly think that Government would consider ridding themselves of the Super Hornet in exchange for F-16 or any other aircraft, then I’m sorry but you are hopelessly out of touch with Government thinking on these issues.
A more likely scenario than yours would be the complete cancellation of the Super Hornet capability, the complete dissolution of 1 and 6 Sqns and RAAF left running 3x sqns of increasingly tired legacy Hornets as it’s sole combat aircraft.
Be careful what you wish for and all that. That’s what RAAF actually wanted…
Regards
JJS.
Hi Jason,
You raise some very good points; but the Super Hornets were supposedly acquired as an interim measure to substitute for the F-111 capability pending availability of the F-35, so why were they not leased instead of being purchased? That way, most of the now ‘sunk’ costs could have been embraced in the leasing deal with flexible termination provisions.
You have acknowledged the air combat superiority of the F-16 over the Super Hornet with both being roughly comparable from a strike perspective so leasing of the F-16 would have a better proposition considering that Hornets and Super Hornets are differing types with not a great deal of commonality.
Before technical deskilling of the Australian military in favour of outsourcing, the Air Force in particular had no great difficulty in coping with change of aircraft types. While it is appropriately loyal to foster those of our small defence industries that might be reasonably efficient, many of them have now been more or less absorbed by the big multinational arms conglomerates who feed voraciously at both the acquisition and support ends of hardware procurement. Consider the somewhat smelly $800 million support program for the Wedgetail just recently approved for Boeing.
You have really endorsed my longstanding view that defence science and industry support as a major plank of defence policy takes precedence over cost-effectiveness at enormous cost to the taxpayer.
Re the F-22. Indeed a very remote possibility that production could continue, but the US politico-military scenario is very uncertain at present and who knows what might happen if the F-35 project is canned? The big workforce at Lockheed Martin would have to be kept employed for political reasons so previous decisions could conceivably be rescinded and the posture toward export of the F-22 could change to make continued manufacture more viable economically. The technology and capabilities jumps between Super Hornet and F-35/F-22 are of course huge.
Methinks Australia dug itself into a very big hole by not extending F-111 life for a reasonable period, unwisely subsidizing F-35 development and then paying to have Super Hornets manufactured, supposedly as an interim capability instead of leasing maybe some available F-16s. Seemingly, the scene is now set for wearing out of the Hornet fleet and acquiring more Super Hornets, if the F-35 falls over. That does not inspire great confidence regarding future RAAF air combat capability.
This has been good dialogue but I am inclined to withdraw now to avoid it becoming tedious for those monitoring.
Thanks Bushranger,
I’ll leave it here too, seeing as though no-one else seems interested in discussing what MIGHT be done rather than continually obsessing over “pie in the sky” dreams such as the F-22 for Australia.
One final point though, I did not at any time concede that the F-16 is a better air combat aircraft than the F/A-18E/F Block II Super Hornet. I did admit that under certain conditions the F-16 is a superior kinematic performer, but this is hardly the be-all and end-all of air combat. The Super Hornet for instance is widely acknowledged as the superior “slow” aircraft in the “phone booth” and over on F-16 you can read reports by CURRENT F-16 pilots about the difficulties they have with the Shornet during ACM.
Add in the fact that the 2 aircraft utilise the same A2A weapons and similar (though definitely in favour of the Super Hornets, particularly versus non-AESA equipped F-16′s) sensor systems, but the SH is a much less “observable” aircraft than any F-16 variant there really is a “struck match” between the 2.
The difference is thus this:
One can accelerate a bit quicker, is a bit faster, has better instaneous turn rates and with CFT’s fitted has marginally longer legs. The other has a superior radar, superior low observability, better sustained turn rates and has better nose authority and “point ability”.
One is a completely new system to RAAF, that our people and supporting industry have no expertise in whatsoever. The other has had years of work and tens of millions spent by RAAF and Industry to prepare for the arrival and TLS of the capability.
As I said earlier, more than $1.5b would be lost if the Super Hornet were cancelled and another fighter chosen. The benefit would be a fighter with some improved kinematic performance, but less sensor, avionic and low observable capabilities.
If the Super Hornet IS lacking in A2A and I’m not at all convinced it is, there is plenty that could be done for $1.5b to improve it… EPE engines, IRST and faster integration of AIM-120D AMRAAM spring to mind…