Business Spectator, a Crikey network partner, has published a timely warning by Robert Gottliebsen that the US is edging closer to cancelling the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter or JSF, which would have dire consequences for Australia’s defences.
Gottliebsen nails it. His report demands more than attention from those concerned about defence matters, notably the epidemic of gross corporate dishonesty and media negligence that characterises high technology marketing in our times.
The defence reporting media, and our defence establishment in its craven, slavish, compromised and unquestioning support for this project has already sold Australia short.
Our defence establishment behaved in relation to the JSF as a promotional arm of lead contractor Lockheed Martin rather than a customer. It misled or captured a succession of defence ministers.
For this reporter, there is a wider issue at stake in that media reporting is fundamentally compromised by a decline in editorial standards from that of inquiring into issues and claims to becoming purveyors of communications solutions to government departments, policy makers, and corporations that manufacture and distribute their own marketable versions of reality.
It is the other side of the decline of traditionally structured media, but in my view, the new and evolving forms of on-line media don’t command the resources to take over the roles largely abandoned by the legacy media.
That could, in the immediate future, prove as damaging to our society as an air power strategy based on hype and bungling.
21 Comments
Ben Sandilands’ slurring of the “defence reporting media” over its coverage of the JSF is out of order. I, and my counterparts at other papers and magazines, have reported regularly on the JSF’s travails. I’d go so far as to say that the majority of coverage of the JSF focuses on cost and schedule overruns.
I’m in no position to judge the technical merits or otherwise of the JSF, but I’ve made an effort to quote people who are. Including the folks at Air Power Australia.
Dan Oakes
Defence and Foreign Affairs Correspondent
The Age | The Sydney Morning Herald
Somebody (or somebodies) owes Carlo Kopp and Peter Goon an apology.
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/murdochs-were-given-secret-defence-briefings-2326517.html
Agree with wilful.
Too late to change to 100 or so mixed F18Es/F15SE?
I believe there are some MIG going cheap in the region: lotta upgrading taking place.
And one could point to the benefits of a eurofighter deal: the troops on the ground know each other from AF, navy joint exercises in the gulf has been european-rich, its not as if ANZUS is the only military relationship being maintained and the spanish are already in love with us for ship-building..
Not holding our breaths, Wilful & Cat, but thanks.
At United States Naval Test Pilot School we were taught “…though systems are very important, they do not a fighter aircraft make!” (Flying into a defence disaster, December 6.)
The Super Hornet has some wonderful systems but, as a fighter aircraft, has some seriously Degraded Operational Gradients (a.k.a. the flight test term known as DOGs) when compared with the aircraft already in our region, let alone what’s almost certain to be flying in Australasian skies post 2015.
There is no doubt those wonderful systems in the Super Hornet (and those promised to be in the JSF, someday) will give their pilots incredible situational awareness as to how and when they are about to meet their maker.
Propositions like this and others have been put to very senior personnel in the defence portfolio to consider.
Alas, no explanation has been forthcoming as to how they intend to stop that happening.
http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-NOTAM-05072010-1.html
However, the more important and overarching question is, how will the Australian Defence Forces fulfil their primary function – the maintenance and sustainment of peace – when they are left operating inordinately overly expensive machines that are grossly overmatched in the region?
Time to dig up a few recently planted F-111Gs?
And the USAF is looking to dramatically extend the service life of their remaining F-15s.
Meanwhile, Gripen has just made its 5th air force, following Switzerland’s decision.
Although I think the RAAF should only consider twin-engined aircraft such as Typhoon/Eurofighter or Rafale.
You are dead right about the defense establishment falling for the manufacturers spin and then capturing a succession of defense ministers Ben. This could well end up another Seasprite helicopter debacle on a grand scale if the JSF order is cancelled.
David:
Of course, what you say is correct.
The challenge, now, before all is to ensure “they don’t throw the baby out with the bathwater”.
There has been a lot of time & effort and treasure expended, along with political capital as well as heaps of collaborative international good-will invoked to put together the wherewithall to build the next air combat capability for many Western nations.
For instance, that moving production line at Ft Worth is made up of leading edge technologies as are a few of the systems and other aspects in the JSF design (e.g. the materials technologies, etc.)
However, they are building the wrong product – yes, the aircraft is the wrong aircraft and does not belong among 5th Generation Fighters.
http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-NOTAM-130210-1.html
Why not take all that is good and proper in the JSF Program and focus it on building the right product?
Or will the historical approach of “throwing the baby out with the bathwater” prevail because people are too stubborn to learn the lessons because they are not prepared to acknowledge and accept that mistakes have been made?
From day one, this has all been about reputations which, it may surprise some to know, is the centrepiece of the marketing strategy which captured such reputations so early in the now still borne life of this program.
There can be no doubt that to learn the lessons there needs to be acknowledgement of the accountabilities but as for the blame for this whole mess is concerned, it should be sheeted back to those responsible – those who behaved badly and did the misleading, in the first place.
No cupid dolls or cookies for figuring out where the blame for this truly resides.
Brett:
Sorry if this comes across the wrong way but regarding what is happening to the F-111 fleet, I choose not to comment on such gross stupidity, especially since it all came to pass because of someone’s pathological hatred for the F-111.
As for twin engined options, why not the F-22A Raptor?
My colleagues and I have spent a bit of time studying this problem and, as a result, have some things to contribute to all of this.
While those within the Defence Portfolio responsible, and thus accountable, for this mess justifed their views on the basis of feeling “extremely confident” and “very comfortable”, our views are based upon data and facts that have been published for all to see and test, along with the evidence.
The F-22 is the only machine that can provide Australia with the technological and strategic edge to maintain and sustain the regional air superiority, as successive CDF’s and Department Heads over the past decade were directed to do in the 2000 and 2009 Defence White Papers of successive governments.
Why these directions have not been followed, let alone achieved, is a question well worth asking of those now in charge and, thus, responsible/accountable.
Australia was never offered the F-22 fullstop. If Japan , with North Korea just a 1000k away cant have it either then the US wouldnt reconsider.
Could be the US is going with option B for the F35. Sacking Lockheed and giving the project to Boeing ? ie a Boeing- Northrop BAE project.
Oh, ghostwhowalksnz:
And you know this because and how?
http://tinyurl.com/bvrawmb
http://tinyurl.com/7b57fkv
Pays not to believe bullshit.
BEN: Thanks, once again, for revealing the gross capitulation of all things Australian to the almighty USA. Gosh! We’ll even take your shonky aircraft and we will kiss you for doing it. What? How are we going to defend Oz without any servicable (sic) air planes? Of course, I’d forgotten how you are going to defend us with the last drop of your blood. (Gives a very hollow laugh).
Rip & Read news has existed for a long time. The term used to refer to the paper-roll printer which would sit in the corner of the Newsroom continually printing the ‘wire’ feeds from newsagencies like AAP and Reuters. Someone would just tear off the paper with the news text and hand it straight to the newsreader to read, without any editorial oversight.
These days Rip & Read could also refer to the action of pulling the piece of paper from the fax or printer containing the freshly received press release, and handing it to the newsreader to read verbatim.
A very large proportion of the news we get originates from a press release. There’s no money to pay people to find facts.
ggm and Brett – the Eurofighter and Grippen don’t have the range we need. They’re also (at best) generation 4.5 aircraft.
Horde – !sigh! – how many times does it have to be said, THE F-22 ISN’T AN OPTION!!! The US wouldn’t even sell it to the UK or Israel and by *Congressional* legislation it is reserved for the US. AND IT’S OUT OF PRODUCTION!!! Note that it is also a dedicated air superiority fighter and hence we’d need a second aircraft for ground attack etc – in that scenario (and only that scenario) the Super Hornets might make sense.
Re. concurrency in bleeding edge projects – it’s been used by the US before with success (Polaris missile project is a classic example). Rework isn’t unknown either – qv B29 program and mass reworks in “The Battle of Kansas”, which in hindsight was a hiccup on the way to a magnificent aircraft. It used to mean trading off money for time to get a new platform into service earlier – however in the case of the F-35 it appears to have produced the worst of both worlds. As with so many other things, it seems the US is no longer able to do things it did decades ago. Anyone else noted the parallels with the Boeing 787???
Anyway, in my post-retirement casual job at a toy/hobby store we just got in two plastic kits of the new Chinese stealth fighter. Impressive bit of equipment by the look of it. And we want to fly Super Hornets against it? Gloster Gladiators vs Me109s comes to mind…
Mr. Street,
The Eurofighter doesn’t have the range we need? The F-35 will scarcely solve that problem.
Range (at a given speed, altitude and loading) is largely a function of internal fuel vs weight. The Eurofighter comes with a pair of conformal fuel tanks; together these carry 3000 litres (8250lb) of jet fuel. The f-35 doesn’t have CFTs. Any CFTs developed for it would further fatten the already bulbous fuselage on that overweight machine.
The fuel loads tally up thus (figures from Wikipedia):
F-35 Eurofighter
Internal fuel 18500lb 9900+8250=18150lb
Empty weight 29300lb (estimated) 24600lb (currently operational aircraft)
Thus each pound of fuel in the F-35 has to propel more weight through the air. The exact difference varies with aircraft loading but it will be around 10%-20% difference, against the F-35.
Please also keep in mind that correcting the recently discovered problems with structural cracking in the F-35 is likely to further increase the weight of an already overweight machine. Another disadvantage is that the F-35 would have to use afterburner more generously than a Typhoon because the F-35 has a fatter fuselage, higher bypass ratio and a lesser wing sweep. Afterburner raises not only fuel consumption, but also the risk of detection with infra-red search and track systems.
I’m not a big fan of the Eurofighter, or the Super Hornet that you mention, but the F-35 is no better on range. It won’t come close to the Chinese aircraft you mention if both of them perform as advertised.
***REFORMATTED TABLE FOR ABOVE POST***
Apologies for the unclear table above. Reformatted below:
F-35
Internal fuel 18500lb Empty weight 29300lb (estimated; testing not complete)
Eurofighter
Internal Fuel + CFTs 18150lb Empty weight 24600lb (currently operational aircraft)
What Fueldrum said.
Also, the F135 engine weighs some 6,400lbs while the F119 engine on which it is based would weigh ~4,300lbs when fitted with a standard, axisymmetric nozzle/AB section.
Why is this you may wonder?
It is because of the STOVL requirement of the F-35B USMC aircraft and the need to provide some 30,000 SHP (with the associated torque) to drive the Lift Fan.
Basically, the F135 engine for the JSF brings with it over 2,000lbs of deadweight when fitted to the non-STOVL-ing F-35A and F-35C JSF variants (plus the additional weight of the airframe structure needed to carry and support that 2,000lbs of dead weight in flight).
All that additional inertia in this engine does wonders for the specific fuel consumption (NOT) and goes some way to explain why the jet needs such a large internal fuel load as does the girth and dumpiness of the aircraft, itself.
This is one of over 25 reasons why the F-35B STOVL JSF (which is the baseline design for the other two variants) is referred to as the Aerospace version of Herpes – the gift that will just keep on giving, even after it has been farmed out to aviation museums and to sit up on posts in front of USMC air bases around the country.
In his article, Robert Gottliebsen states the Hornets (Super or otherwise) are no longer competitive in our region.
Why is that so?
Put simply, these jets (and the F-35 JSF) are Tier Two strike/fighter aircraft to the Tier One Sukhoi Su-30 and F-15SG aircraft already flying while the already developed upgrades to the Su-27s just reinforce this position.
Come 2020 (if not 2015) and beyond, the Super Hornet will be grossly overmatched by aircraft like the Su-35S Super Flanker, 5th Generation T-50 PAK-FA and, now, China’s F-111 size 5th Generation Chengdu J-20.
When discussing the Super Hornet, the Chief of Air Force said as much though with a slightly more optimistic, rosy and predictable outlook (before 2025) when he appeared before the full Joint Standing Committee for Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade (JSCFADT) of the Australian Parliament only but a month ago!
The Australia Defence Association has long had firm views on the JSF project (and the whole process of developing the new air combat capability). Many articles in our publications over the last decade have highlighted the issues involved.
But simply comparing different aircraft as airframes or even platforms is not sufficient. Even comparing different air combat systems (aircraft, tanking, early warning, missiles, ordnance, command & control, etc) is not enough. The strategic context and potential operational scenarios must also be included – as well as all the budgetary, through-life support and industry capability maintenance aspects.
From the start, for a range of strategic, operational and technological reasons, the ADA has advocated replacing the F-18 and F-111 fleets with a mix of aircraft for strike and air defence (and air control) rather than rely on just one so-called, “jack-of-all-trades-but-master-of-none” all-rounder. This is based on a range of strategic, tactical, workforce management, technological and financial considerations.
And on Australia’s experience in the 1960s and 1970s with operating singe-engined, single-seat aircraft over water.
Geo-strategically, any Australian defence capability needs range as a first-order characteristic no matter whewther it is a ship, vehicle or aircraft. With aircraft (and supporting systems), BVR engagement capability is also vital. As are adequate numbers and hopefully a capability edge.
In the 2003-2007 period we extensively covered the discussions as to whether the life-of-type of the F-111 could and should be extended. Good examples included Carlo Kopp’s “Stretching the F-111 Past 2010″ in the Autumn 2004 issue of “Defender”, and Don Middleton’s “Are the F-111s Really Stuffed” in the Summer 2006/07 issue.
We also arranged for the RAAF to debate its critics in our journal as early as March 2004, and regretted that Air Force Headquarters withdrew from this arrangement at the last moment before publication. It is the ADA’s belief that this decision to not debate its critics has severely backfired over the long run.
In 2006 we began noting that on then current trends procuring the F-35 could end up more expensive than the F-22. This has largely occurred.
We also championed actually asking the US for the option of buying an export version of the F-22 (around 30-40 aircraft as part of the mix, rather than just assuming the US would always say no to its export.
As the financial, technological and developmental risks of the F-35 project have continued to increase, some key lessons need to be drawn:
- open public debate on force structure options is always good as long as it is informed;
- not debating your critics is always a mistake;
- asking for a reliance on trust, and on data that cannot be made public for security reasons, does not replace effective public debate;
- relying on a developmental aircraft (the F-35) made by the same manufacturer as its only rival (the F-22) does not work as the manufacturer has every incentive to flog the new one and not the old (proven) one because that is where the longer-term profits are;
- relying on stealth, largely alone, over the life of the 30-40 year life of new aircaft will probably not be enough as counter-stealth technologies will also improve dramatically and probably early in such a period.
I could go on but other issues press (the JSF is not the only major defence issue confronting Australia and this sense of perspective needs to be maintained by all debate participants).
Neil James
Executive Director
Australia Defence Association
http://www.ada.asn.au
Mr. Oakes,
With due respect you have to admit that the coverage of the F-35 has fallen far short of what should occur in a democratic society. According to a search on http://www.theage.com.au, The Age last mentioned the F-35 by name more than a month ago (Rafael Epstein’s November 3 article). Since that time considerable fresh evidence has emerged that this program is a forthcoming disaster for Australia’s national security, but not a square inch of pagination has been found to report it. This may not be due to any fault of yours but it needs to be put on the record that coverage, for whatever reason, is far from adequate. Mr Sandiland’s criticism is not “slurring,” and is certainly not “out of order.”
Admiral Venlet, who is the commanding officer of the JSF program office, has had much to say about this in the last few days; so has Senator McCain of the Senate armed services committee (who successfully killed the Boeing tanker lease deal and could do the same to the F-35). Senator McCain (but not the Australian media) informs us that “Admiral Venlet’s message last week clearly conveyed that the path we are on is neither affordable nor sustainable…If things do not improve – quickly – taxpayers and the warfighter will insist that ALL OPTIONS WILL BE ON THE TABLE. AND THEY SHOULD BE. We cannot continue on this path.” (emphasis added). None of this rated a mention in the Australian Media, despite the very obvious implications for us.
The decision to export uranium to India got saturation coverage for more than a week, but that decision has far less implication for regional nuclear weapons proliferation than the failure of the F-35. If the F-35 program fails altogether (which is entirely possible), a number of major SE Asian nations who have abstained to date from developing nuclear weapons are likely to decide that they have little choice but to develop them. The uranium decisions gets saturation coverage while the F-35′s ongoing follies don’t rate a mention.
Even if the F-35 program produces a flyable aircraft the US Navy’s Carrier Battle Groups will be unable to approach within range of Chinese or Russian airbases; their aircraft will be hopelessly outclassed unless the F-35′s performance improves dramatically from where it is now. The F-35B will also certainly be unable to protect American amphibious forces in our region. Despite this, the decision to allow a very small USMC base at Darwin gets saturation coverage; the F-35′s inadequacy goes unmentioned.
“In fact,” we are informed by Senator McCain, “flight testing sufficient to demonstrate the full mission systems and weapons delivery capability of the F-35 aircraft has not even started. At this point, this most advanced phase of flight testing won’t begin any sooner than 2015.” Yet the Australian mainstream media still conveys the promises of F-35 advertisements and salespeople as if they were facts. Without proper testing they are hopes and dreams, not facts.
If the media doesn’t ensure that voters are properly informed, what will pressure politicians to change direction when required? Time has passed and the need for a major change in direction is becoming urgent. Financial journalists like Robert Gottliebsen have other important work to do. Should it really be left up to him, and websites like Crikey, to fulfill this vital function in a democracy?
Re the Neil James post of December 7, 2011.
The second para perhaps inadvertently alludes to the seriously flawed Australian government philosophy supported by both of the main political parties, this being the central plank of defence policy is industry support rather than maintaining continuous adequate and credible military preparedness through progressive optimisation of proven platforms in service, where cost-effective. Subsidising largely foreign-parented defence industry in Australia is principally low productivity employment creation similar to the motor vehicle industry with profits being siphoned offshore.
The goal of generating a somewhat mythical Force 2030 structure has/is creating multiple capability gaps and commitments to through life support arrangements for new hardware inhibits flexibility to alter force structures downstream with changing strategic circumstances and technological advances. For example, Wedgetail might never meet the sales pitch capabilities and AEW&C might not be a viable role a decade downstream, yet whole of life support has apparently been contracted!
Having flown Sabres in the 1960s (designed primarily as a day interceptor), I do not agree that a twin-engine air combat machine is necessary for operations surrounding the Australian continent. Sure we lost a few Sabres and Mirages, but aircraft engine reliability has improved markedly since that era as evidenced by pretty low attrition for the F-16 with upwards of 4,400 airframes having hitherto been produced. Unfortunately, a certain Group Captain was permitted to exercise too much influence regarding type selection in 1981, resulting in acquisition of the F-18 which does not have the range capability of the F-16 on integral fuel (depending on how configured).
John Boyd’s contempt for so-called multi-role combat aircraft was justifiable and some of the best military aircraft produced have been designed primarily for specific roles – the Caribou, Huey, A-10 are just some examples. Despite the USAF hierarchy preventing him from fully optimising the F-16 as a light-weight air combat vehicle, the huge amount of R&D since performed to enable potential enhancement of that platform well exceeds the growth potential of the F-18 (see: http://www.f-16.net/f-16_versions.html).
US needs for pure stealth capability will probably be satisfied by optimising existing F-22, F-117 (50 or so are presently in controlled climate storage) and B-2 fleets, but that is arguably an unaffordable luxury for most nations of the world and the F-35 is not shaping up well in that regard, nor in multiple other respects. Radar and sensor technologies from the F-22/F-35 programs are being adapted for incorporation in other types to enable BVR air combat capabilities.
Failure to extend F-111 service life – with suitable platform enhancements – unnecessarily stampeded Australia into Super Hornet acquisition and the flexibility to acquire say an F-16XL derivative would probably be negated should the US go down that track to keep Lockheed Martin in business, if the F-35 program is terminated. Other F-16 version production and upgrading is of course ongoing.
American politicians erred in permitting Lockheed Martin to virtually bribe other nation participation as JSF development partners while both the F-16 and F-22 were also being produced by the same manufacturer. Huge political embarrassment will likely ensue downstream if the F-35 program is not curtailed.