Has Qantas been mislead on the 787, or is it just too dumb to know or care?
It is one thing for the media to witlessly parrot Boeing press releases about the super light weight benefits of 787 Dreamliner, which is incredibly late, heavy and disappointing in its stop/start limited release into production and introduction, but are the airlines really that stupid?
The answer may be ‘Yes’, and in the case of Qantas, someone needs to ask why it kept ignoring the reality after the deliveries promised for 2008, then 2009, then 2011, then 2012, fell though.
As in, ‘hmm, I wonder if something isn’t quite right with the 787?’.
These nagging set of questions are back in focus today because of a truly ugly report by Flightblogger, Jon Ostrower, well, ugly in terms of content. Flightblogger has been to the 787 program what Pravda was to Kremlin watchers before the fall of the USSR.
The 787 is struggling to better the fuel burn of a 767-300 with winglets on a comparison based on longer flight stages.
Flightblogger is, like Pravda was, an impeccable conduit for the information that the power it reports on is for various arcane reasons, always too slow, or too indirect, to promptly or reliably release.
There has been no reliable guidance from Boeing on the 787 program since mid 2007. Not one of its quarterly investor briefings has ever proven accurate in its guidance on this program, not even from one quarter to the next quarter, a matter of only 13 weeks.
Read Ostrower’s report and grind your teeth. Then let the meaning sink in. There is no 20% improvement over anything being delivered, so painfully slowly, from among the dozens of incomplete 787 carbon barrels and wingsets that clog the Everett final assembly area awaiting variously the undoing, redoing and completion, of these jets.
Yet this 20% better metric, sprinkled like pixie dust over so much of the PR guidance generated by Boeing, be in in fuel burn reductions, or structural weight savings, or anything else, has become inseparably joined in popular media reports to almost everything said about the Dreamliner.
This situation, of underperforming 787s, may persist for years, not just as the Everett backlog of unfinished or blemished 787-8s are brought up to deliverability, but as the redesign work involved in the 787-9 comes to grips with the enormity of the -8 stuff ups.
In December James Albaugh, the president and CEO of Boeing Commerial Airplanes, may have been setting the die for the harsh realities that are now emerging about the Dreamliner program, by telling a conference that Boeing needed to go back to its roots and become an engineering centric company.
He was variously reported as saying that the emphasis in Boeing had to become one of under promising and over delivering and that he looked forward to an end of trips to various airline customers to explain to them that the Boeings they had ordered weren’t going to do all of the things that had been claimed for them.
This means reversing the existing order, of over promising and under delivering. Albaugh has to deal with a hype-centric legacy at Boeing, and has plenty of challenges avoiding a repeat of the 787 fiasco with the 737 MAX program, as well as bringing on a 777-X program to carry forward the success of a jet family that is a brilliant reminder of what Boeing achieved with a design that came from an engineering centric Boeing that was all but totally destroyed after the McDonnell Douglas merger.
It may be, when the management histories of these times are written, that airlines become case studies of how engineering expertise and rational analysis of technical claims was sidelined or expelled by executives and boards that were peculiarly vulnerable to being mislead about the merits of new technologies based on sales opportunities rather than hard facts.
Qantas, the world’s second largest 787 customer, has 50 Dreamliners on firm order according to current guidance, 15 of them -8s and 35 of them -9s, the more capably specified model for which Air New Zealand is the launch customer.
Four years after Qantas actually knew that the program was starting to slip, it continues to rabbit on about the immediacy and benefits of the Dreamliners, without even the slightest sign of recognising that it has been willingly fooled, and with no clear and reliable indication as to exactly what it is going to get and when.
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I’m assuming behind the scenes at Qantas there’s sheer terror at the folly of the 787s, but they obviously aren’t going to promote these views on the aircraft publicly. Not that it will make up for the apparent mistake in buying the things, but aircraft purchase contracts have hefty penalties for non-achievement of promised technical specs.
I’m confused about Boeing’s desire to go back to being an engineering company: engineer’s were obviously part of the problem in promoting the idea of a plastic aircraft in the first place and should take the blame if the thing doesn’t work. If true, the statement that the 787 achieves the same fuel efficiency as the all-metal 30 year old 767-300 is terrifying!
by Lofi on Jan 15, 2012 at 5:32 pm
Ben the data that he uses as I read it a few days ago seemed confusing at best? There are comments based on long range tests by Boeing and extrapolations of short range flights by ANA. I definitely see a chance that the 20% is going to be hard to achieve but a key factor with that was meant to be the GE engines that haven’t gained certification yet. Three critical factors to consider: 1. The lowering of drag coefficient Vs the 767-300 with winglets 2. The efficiency of the GEntec engine Vs those of the 767-300 and lastly the total mass of the 767-300 Vs the 787-8 I know nothing about drag comparison but hypothesise 2% better is optimistic, engine efficiency maybe 7 to 10%?? but the weight factor should be a known known. Can you comment or elucidate on any of this?? BTW, Qantas seem to have their head in the sand re the non ordering of the 777. Old folk like me and business are where they will gain their best margins yet they seem to ignore these demographics and chase low margin no frills.
by David Lloyd on Jan 15, 2012 at 5:48 pm
Lofi, by the by, Boeing has publicly stated that this is such new technology that they are in effect learning on the job. We all remember an Americas Cup yacht using new plastic technology, OneAustralia as I recall, that sank/split??? Could be a little more dramatic with a plane if they get it wrong. I love the concept and think it will deliver benefits but pray that it doesn’t send Boeing into Chapter 11, McDonnell Douglas Curates Egg so to speak.
by David Lloyd on Jan 15, 2012 at 6:00 pm
David,
My wish list for Plane Talking is for a decent search facility to be incorporated in WordPress, as it would make pulling up what are dozens of stories about this straightforward for all of us.
However here is a start.
This first story has some fascinating graphics that neither Aviation Week not Plane Talking were supposed to see as they were commercial in confidence but were posted by NASA inadvertently for while. We both published from them, but the originals vanished from the NASA site.
http://blogs.crikey.com.au/planetalking/2010/05/25/how-far-has-myth-making-outflown-the-realities-of-plastic-jets/
Some more recent stories are linked below.
http://blogs.crikey.com.au/planetalking/2011/06/11/is-tin-back-in-at-boeing-or-airbus/
and
http://blogs.crikey.com.au/planetalking/2011/11/11/airbus-starts-to-push-its-plastic-limits-too/
I’m advised, nay, firmly lectured, that monocoque composites are the future, in that the internal load structures common to today’s designs are incorporated in the free form aerodynamic walls. Similarly the conductivity issue is dealt with by a conductive surface bonded to the next generation composites below.
The overall problem for Boeing and Airbus today is that while the claimed structural weight savings in the materials exist, to work in jets with the technology currently achievable they need the addition of ‘heavy’ metals, bringing with them the issues of galvanic response and other nasties, whereas thin load bearing cycle exposed structures using aluminium lithium do not require the addition of ‘heavy’ plastics to render them conductive and so forth.
Current carbon fibre reinforced plastic structures require giant autoclaves or ovens to complete the process of bonding layers of burned carbon string to resins, and there is an issue within replicating the exact weight and structure on each unique carbon fibre woven or structured jet as opposed to cutting metal.
It is interesting that metal alloys entered aircraft construction to overcome the shortfalls of early composites, such as glued layers of wood and canvas, only to fall out of favor to carbon barrel hype.
by Ben Sandilands on Jan 15, 2012 at 6:28 pm
Ben,
The Flightblogger discussion is based on a model – do you (or does anyone) know it is true?
Your article is a little sensationalist – lets better understand reality before this level of panic.
by Pete on Jan 15, 2012 at 8:50 pm
This also highlights what a good aircraft the 767 is. Although much derided for domestic ops, I wonder whether Qantas has considered a top-up order for regional and long-haul routes? Doubtless it’d be far cheaper and more readily available than a 777.
by Rufus on Jan 15, 2012 at 10:24 pm
Lofti,
You are somewhat incorrect in your assumption that engineer’s were part of the problem in promoting a “plastic” jet. There is nothing wrong with composites per se, the issue is of course when the hype overtakes the reality. And I would not assume that it was the engineers that were the problem in promoting there use over evolutions of traditional metallic alloys as engineers tend by their nature to be a conservative lot, we dont like surprises. Most likely their concerns were drowned out by another group. Where you need to direct your attention is to the inevitable problem of overhyping idiot salesmen directing the show. Both Boeing (787) and Airbus (A-380) have suffered from this in recent years. Hiring clowns who promise the world because their end of year bonus depends upon it is fraught with danger. Couple this with filtering by accounting branches who assume (instead of find out) what they see is correct and you have all the ingredients for a turd pie.
David,
Qantas has more than just it’s head in the sand over the 777 it has sand up to it’s ankles! Within the last 6-9 months it has been stated at staff meetings when the question is raised about “why dont we just order some 777′s?” ( and I semi quote here) “The 777 is the worst possible aircraft fleet decision we could make”, I kid you not. These idiots, despite the fact that Qantas was involved in drafting the 777 basic operating requirements to suit them, despite the fact that almost every other operator in and out of Sydney uses them happily , despite the fact that they are so reliable and efficient that it could save them many millions on fuel burn and engineering services (the very things they harp on about saving money on), despite the fact that former CEO Dixon admitted publicly that not buying them was a huge mistake, and despite the fact that nobody (not even Airbus) has a bad thing to say about them, absolutely refuse to admit they screwed up, go back on their decision and order a dozen or two ASAP, and instead put out bullshit statements like the aforementioned to people within the company who know this is all arse covering crap.
When you are faced with this sort of incompetence and blind stupidity is it any wonder that they ignore demographics like those you mention?
by thebozeian on Jan 15, 2012 at 10:51 pm
Pete, the PIANO model is widely used for design and development purposes. Boeing may not like the music, but shouldn’t shoot the PIANO player…
by LongTimeObserver on Jan 16, 2012 at 4:03 am
Ben,
Again, a fine report.
The numbers reported by Jon Ostrower, Flightblogger, are open to question and may be too small of a statistical sample to place much weight on. But Flightblogger has supported Boeing and the 787 in particular. He was invited on the inaugural flight and posted an enthusiastic video about the event. There is no question he has key contacts within ANA. That he would even bring the question about fuel consumption public is an indication that more is wrong with this plane than any of us knows.
Don’t blame the engineers. The product manager was a salesman, not an engineer. The engineering was shopped all over the world, not completed by experienced Boeing engineers, a mistake that it appears Boeing is trying to avoid in the 787-9, which is beginning to look more like a new airplane than a derivative. Maybe that is why it is 5 years late.
I am not Australian, so I don’t know about the Qantas end of the story, but I do know that here in the Pacific Northwest of the US the Qantas name was almost legendary 20 years ago. It isn’t anymore. In the US press the Qantas name is associated with one fiasco after another. The 787 simply fits the mode.
by Raetzloff Tim on Jan 16, 2012 at 9:05 am
Ben, WordPress might not have a good search facility, but Google will do it for you just fine:
http://www.google.com.au/search?q=site%3Ablogs.crikey.com.au+787+plastic
http://www.google.com.au/search?q=site%3Ablogs.crikey.com.au+joyce+idiot
by Treenan on Jan 16, 2012 at 10:20 am
This is one sentence:
“Albaugh has to deal with a hype-centric legacy at Boeing,
and has plenty of challenges avoiding a repeat of the 787 fiasco
with the 737 MAX program,
as well as bringing on a 777-X program
to carry forward the success of a jet family
that is a brilliant reminder of what Boeing achieved
with a design that came from an engineering centric Boeing
that was all but totally destroyed
after the McDonnell Douglas merger.”
It shouldn’t be.
by Crapocular on Jan 16, 2012 at 10:54 am
@Raetzloff Tim said,
“I am not Australian, so I don’t know about the Qantas end of the story, but I do know that here in the Pacific Northwest of the US the Qantas name was almost legendary 20 years ago. It isn’t anymore. In the US press the Qantas name is associated with one fiasco after another. The 787 simply fits the mode.”
This is very sad.
by Zarathrusta on Jan 16, 2012 at 6:45 pm
@Raetzloff Tim:
I can back you up on your comments regarding Boeing’s view on Qantas back then: they had nothing but utter respect for the delivery engineers sent over to take delivery of the new aircraft. Things were tested to within an inch, and nothing got out of Everett unless it was pretty much perfect in every way, including no blemishes on the fold down tables! I even got told this on the tour when the tour guide discovered he had a group of Australians. Wonder what they think these days – I guess the 787 strains the discussion somewhat.
by Lofi on Jan 16, 2012 at 7:13 pm
Oh oh lets not overhype the 777 now. I guess it’s a cultural thing.
It’s heavy, the -200 stopped selling a while ago, the LD3s have a wide aisle, the empty attic could house a hundred crew sleeping places, the cabin is not only spacey but also noisy & Boeing is pursuing the -8 and -9 for a reason. I heard they now want to put an A350 wing/engine on it.
by keesje on Jan 17, 2012 at 9:40 am
Subs: Headline should be ‘misled’, not ‘mislead’.
by Roberts Timothy on Jan 17, 2012 at 11:01 am
To keesje,
The 777-300ER appears to be an incredible success:
http://www.seattlepi.com/business/boeing/article/Boeing-books-most-valuable-order-ever-sets-new-2266720.php
by RocketScientist on Jan 17, 2012 at 11:43 am
RocketScientist the 773ER is a great machine indeed. Most of the worlds dominant long haul carriers bought it. It has had little competition in its segment for some time, killed the A340-600 and 747 and will be the only 350 seater for yrs to come. But as every aircraft it is a trade off of capabilities. A few yrs ago it had the best wing one could imagine. Now Boeing wants to replace it. The perfect GE90-115s will be replaced by less powerfull engines for a reason. It’s on the heavy & noisy side. EK bought a awfull lot just like they bought / use an awfull lot A330s/A340s/A380s. The US government (via Im Ex bank) finances a lot of the 777-300ERs for the poor gulf Arabs too..
by keesje on Jan 17, 2012 at 6:57 pm
To expand slightly on my previous post (#7) about salesman hype versus engineering development reality, take a look at this excerpt I have taken from the current lead story over at FG on Etihad canceling some A-350-1000 orders. Just note the difference in what is being said by Tom Enders versus John Leahy.
“…Enders reiterated the airframer’s caution over A350 development, admitting that postponement of its entry to the final assembly line had been decided after the programme “ran into some serious problems” with key elements.
He said the A350′s final assembly would begin in March 2012. Without caution, and assurance of maturity, he said, “you’re setting yourself up for disaster”.”
…… versus this.
“…Chief operating officer for customers John Leahy said he was in discussions with three major airlines for the A350-1000, and added that the main problem was “getting them early delivery positions”.”
So what we have is the Airbus chief cautioning the market about the developmental complexities and in effect explaining to the market that it needs to bare this in mind when ordering (ie; the Etihad’s of the airline world). And on the other we then have this glossed over by it’s chief sales clown who thinks it’s just about early delivery slots. Given that it’s the sales department that customers tend to talk to and they make powerful simplistic public statements like this, is it any wonder that customers get sucked into these programs without fully understanding the complexities? It’s no excuse for poor research but it does show how it can happen.
Read the full story here:
http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/etihad-becomes-first-to-cancel-a350-1000s-366997/
by thebozeian on Jan 18, 2012 at 9:42 am
Great article Ben & no shortage of insightful blogs in response but … the bottom line is, has been for several years & remains, that without major investor or legislative intervention, Qantas Airways will go the way of Ansett, even within the next 5 years. The commercial & operational ineptiude of the present management continues to defy rational explanation.
As unlikely as it is, bringing back Borgetti may in fact be one of the only forms of effective intervention remaining, after 15 long years of managerial dysfunction.
by Banjo on Jan 18, 2012 at 3:51 pm
One of my predictions for 2012 was that Boeing’s engineers would continue to do incredible work as they tried to make up for the extreme cluelessness that management have developed since “taking over” McDonnell Douglas. Ever since that point, Boeing’s management have been plagued with fiasco after fiasco from the tankers through to the 787. Just look at the 737MAX, where it took major customers going off to Airbus before management would acknowledge that a re-engine was required rather than a new aircraft. Even then they were promising huge savings over the competition when the fan diameter hadn’t even been determined and all the re-design issues worked through fully. Management planning that’s driven by sales hype & stock-options
As to Qantas, who’s own management is displaying all too similar actions & delusions, I think the bean counters have taken the approach of getting lower prices on their 787s when they finally arrive as opposed to getting discounted 777s to bridge the gap as many other airlines have done. Oh yes, they’ll be cheaper when they finally arrive, but meanwhile the airline is collapsing for lack of routes & effective aircraft
by Grant McHerron (aka Falcon124) on Jan 22, 2012 at 11:43 am