thanks for that further clarification and time you sppent on it , it seems th change is

1/ to remove a ‘minority’ (less than 50%) Government’s option to call an early election acting alone by itself , AND

2/ to remove a ‘majority’ (over 50%) Goverment’s option to call an early election …(UNLESS Hodgeman’s Legislation allows a ‘majority’ (50% plus) Government to call for th vote and then vote against itself !! AND THEN pretend to say during ‘baton change’ period they do not wish to ‘form’ a new “coalition” Government amongst its own 50% plus members thereby making early electon option ‘live’ , BUT I could not find this option in Hodgeman’s draft)

3/ Implication I got Antony from one of your examples , was a minority Govt acting compliantly with one opposition Party to get over 50% of th House , could forse th “baton change” change provisions , and therefore possible early electon being made ‘live’ (if they were in ‘prior disagreement’ over forming a ‘coalition’ majority Govt …IF I’ve understood that to be case , then presume Hodgeman’s proposed Legislaton does actualy provide for point 2/ option

4/ to allow a ‘majority’ of House members from th ‘opposition’ Partys to forse an early electon if they hav a mind to in advance , after going thru ‘baton change’ and deciding they do not wish to form a ‘coalition’ Government

Certainly it makes ‘cynical ‘early elections being called by majority (50% plus) Govt of day impossible (subject to 2/ and 3/ , and even if they ar operable , still more politcally difficult than is present case)

My interest here Antony , is because indeed I assume Labor will win most ’seats’ , but may not hav 50% plus , thereby making above ‘live’ status in next parliament a possibility Must say that Tas election system has capacity to throw up ‘minority Govt’s , which does diminish somewhat some of benefits of stability & long term policy planing that fixed terms legislation provides in mailand States , where ‘minority’ Govt’s ar less likely , making above options for ‘oppositions’ less likely & leading more likely to fixed terms overall objectives

If the opposition had the numbers to constantly pass votes of no confidence, they would actually be in government. What we have seen in past periods of minority government is the Greens on the cross bench combine with the opposition to defeat the government on specific legislation or motions, but when business moves on to other matters, the opposition and the cross bench did not agree on bringing down the government.

The non-definitive nature of votes of no confidence is recognised in the fixed term legislation by stating that if such a motion is passed, there are 8 days allowed in which a vote of confidence in either the existing ministry or a new ministry must be passed. If a confidence motion is not passed, then the mechanics of an early election begin. This is very similar to the baton change provisions in other states where fixed terms have been introduced. It is what might be termed a positive vote of no confidence, where you can’t bring down an existing government and get an election without first going through process of working out if the existing parliament contains a ministry prepared to serve and with the confidence of the majority of the House.

e.g. NSW Premier Nick Greiner’s resignation was partly forced because the Independents made it clear they were prepared to go through this process if Greiner stayed as Premier. By switching to John Fahey, the crisis with the cross benches was resolved. The government knew Labor would avoid taking office, so the Liberals were faced with changing Leader or being forced to an election they couldn’t win.

If two opposition parties in parliament agree to pass a vote of no confidence, they either have to be agreed to carry through and appoint a new government, or agree to carry through and force a new election. But after the passage of the first vote, the two opposition parties may part company. As occurred in the Field government, the Greens would continue to the point where Field would change his ministry or make some change to policy, but then would desert Liberal attempts to try and force an election. Field was always sure that the Greens weren’t going to force an election if it was going to make Robin Gray Premier again. Once Ray Groom took over as Liberal leader, Field called the election at once in the hope of catching the Liberals unprepared.

It is Field’s snap election which is specifically prevented by fixed term legislation. But the fixed term bill includes a formal provision for a baton change, and it would take a positive action by the majority of parliament to get an early election. In a hung parliament with an opposition consisting of more than one party, the two parties may not necassarily be of a single mind on the wanted outcome of a baton change vote. The opposition could force an early election. The government and one opposition party could force an early election. But in both cases, a majority of the parliament would have to be of a mind to force an early election.

Any balance of power party like the Greens would well know that holding the balance of power for a minority government is a better position to be in than forcing an early election that would deliver majority government to the opposition. That’s why Tony Rundle cut a deal with Labor in 1998 to shrink the House of Assembly and call an early election. Common purpose of the two bigger parties to try and wipe out the Greens, putting both parties on the same playing field in the race for majority government.

You can look at the provions in Hodgman’s bill at: http://www.parliament.tas.gov.au/bills/pdf/10_of_2008.pdf
Section 7 has the baton change provisions, though Section 8 appears to be misdrafted in refering to Section 2 instead of 7.

After all , under those proposed fixed terms proposals , ruling govt already loses its option to call an early electon (a power it forsakes by moving from non fixed terms)

Surely simply replacing any ‘no confidence motion’ with only a successful ‘denial of Supply’ motion as a early e;ecton trigger , would diminish worst of such abuses of ‘no confidense motion’ option in hands of an “opposition” group of Partys with numbers

I think you’re missing the point.

The question was when has a govt voted against itself.

The Martin govt survived the first no-confidence motion thanks to Belinda Stronach’s defection, but lost the second when the NDP withdrew their support. In neither case did the ruling Liberal Party vote against themselves!

http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/11/24/ap/world/mainD8E33JA80.shtml

2PP analysis only works when then are two clear major parties in the overwhelming majority of seats. If minor party vote gets above 25%, you get too many seats where a major party candidate is eliminated, so you can’t get a statewide 2PP whioch is anything other than a book-keeping entry that allows you to order seats. This is even more the case where optional preferential voting is used, as in NSW.