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Could Australia’s record on arms control harm UN Security Council bid?

Last Friday over fifty states at the United Nations rejected US-led attempts to introduce a lesser standard of arms control concerning the production, transfer and deployment of cluster munitions.

The US had intended for Protocol VI to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) to ensure the legality of the world’s “major users and producers” of cluster munitions (affectionately known as MUPPETS by various civil society groups present) to continue to deploy the weapons previously labelled “inhumane” and “indiscriminate”.

Australia, France and the US were not among those fifty states which rejected the proposed text at the United Nations on Friday.

Opposition was led by Norway, Austria, and Mexico, with powerful support from the Cluster Munition Coalition, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and a large number of UN agencies, notably the UN Development Program, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights.

Which got me to thinking about Australia’s bid for a seat on the UN Security Council.

It its core pitch document, Australia prioritises active participation in “international peace and security” as it’s second highest contribution to the UN over its 65 year history. Interestingly, two of Australia’s cited achievements in this arena refer directly to arms control norms:

A record of achievement in international peace and security
Australia:

  • played a leading role in bringing about the Cambodian Peace Settlement
  • played a leading role in the negotiation of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the Chemical Weapons Convention
  • initiated the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons and, more recently with Japan, the International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament
  • has contributed 65,000 personnel to more than 50 UN and other multilateral peace and security operations worldwide, including in Timor-Leste, Solomon Islands, Lebanon, Sudan, Cyprus and Korea

But one wonders whether policy decisions and proposals that Gillard has announced in November could unravel Australia’s UN Security Council bid which is predicated on the idea that, “We do what we say”.

Obama’s Darwin naval base

Obama’s visit to Australia coincided with the announcement that Darwin would become a “rotational deployment” for US Naval forces. Widely believed by strategic analysts to be an American nod toward China (perhaps Hugh White has the most shrewd analysis) it also, I blogged early on, would pave the way for US forces to “stockpile and transit” cluster munitions in and on Australian territory with oversight only by the Department of Defence.

Cluster munitions ratification

Last Tuesday the Labor Caucus voted not to amend its widely criticised Cluster Munitions Prohibition Bill – which serves to ratify the international Cluster Munitions Convention (which is a different instrument to the CCW stil being negotiated above) signed in 2008 – to remove two loopholes, but did make a small concession by agreeing to issue a policy statement stating that it was the current Government’s intention not to allow stockpiling of cluster munitions on Australian soil.

However the provision in the legislation explicitly permitting stockpiling will remain, and many are rightly worried that a future – or present – government may reneg on their stated commitment.

Indeed, under Rudd and Gillard Labor have taken an active role behind the scenes to ensure a number of loopholes can be read into the treaty text when Australia comes to ratify. For instance on 27 Feb 2008, a cable sent to Washington from the US Embassy in Canberra:

“Australia would welcome U.S. assistance in identifying African countries with potential interoperability issues who can be recruited to vote with the Like-minded and in reviewing the proposed interoperability text. Once they are identified, the [Government of Australia] and other like-minded countries intend to reach out to these countries with information and education on the issues.”

And then on 26 November 2008 at the US Embassy Canberra:

“Australian representatives informed U.S. counterparts that Australia will take a broad view of the activities permitted because of Article 21 of the CCM.”

“In bilateral consultations on the margins of the CCW meetings September 1-5, Australian counterparts briefed the U.S. delegation on Australia,s legal interpretation of Article 21. Although a written copy of the legal advice could not be provided, the briefer noted that most forms of military cooperation could continue. The official interpretation concerning interoperability/combined operations is that the only prohibited action would be for embedded or third-party force Australian personnel to physically fire or drop cluster munitions. This would be applicable to a limited number of Australian officers serving with U.S. units. Another action identified that is not legally prohibited, but politically difficult, would be for Australian officers serving in a combined headquarters and who were part of the chain of command, for example if the officer is in charge of targeting. These latter two issues may require further discussion and would be best worked in mil-mil channels because they relate directly to operations.”

And alarmingly on 28 January 2009 at the US Embassy Canberra:

“[Director, Arms Control andCounter-Proliferation Branch] McGuire also advised that the Japanese have consulted with Australia and other countries on what criminal penalties will be adopted, including incarceration and financial penalties. He noted with interest that the Japanese are proposing to use contract employees to move cluster munitions around on U.S. bases in Japan to avoid contravening the Convention’s handling prohibitions”.

Gillard’s about-turn on uranium

On 15 November Gillard made the extraordinary announcement that she will put to Labor national conference in December a change in party policy such that Australia may begin selling selling uranium to India. What immediately struck me was how ‘moral’ the debate has made out to be.

Chief among Gillard’s three reasons was that, “selling uranium to India will be good for the Australian economy and good for Australian jobs”. No mention was made of the NPT or the likely security implications – both regional and international – that would flow from India’s acquisition of greater supplies of uranium.

Most worryingly, if approved, this action would go completely against the Australian-sponsored International Commission on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament report in 2009:

“10.5… One criticism – frequently voiced since the India agreement – is that [Nuclear Suppliers Group] members may be driven by commercial incentives to be less rigorous in their approach to countries not applying comprehensive safeguards or not party to the NPT.”

“10.7 The main substantive problem with the deal is that it removed all non-proliferation barriers to nuclear trade with India in return for very few significant non-proliferation and disarmament commitments by it. The view was taken that partial controls – with civilian facilities safeguarded – were better than none.”

Wither Australia’s normative leadership

Combined with a perceived level of indifference for the rule of law during the 2003 invasion of Iraq, and the Gillard governments voting against Palestine’s UNESCO membership, it is inconceivable that Australia may reasonably pitch themselves as principled and responsible international citizens at this time.

What do you think?

Postscript: On 4 December: the ALP national conference voted 215 to 184 in favour of relaxing the ALP’s policy position on compulsory NPT membership. As a result, uranium is to be sold to India in due course.

Heavy lobbying and orchestration of op-eds and media work played an important role in getting the vote through according to Nitin Pai, editor of Pragati – The Indian National Interest Review, and Fellow at The Takshashila Institution who tweeted:

@Rory_Medcalf And let me say that the consistent policy advocacy by a certain Sydney based think tank surely played an important role.

The response from Lowy was predictable:

@acorn Very kind Nitin, but I must stress that Lowy authors have openly advocated different personal views – all proudly independent!

Belatedly, I’ve assembled some of my Tweets this morning for the record:

@acorn Yes, as we were warning by MIT research re. previous US deal. Well spotted same forces here: bit.ly/sIuqwh

#ALPnc mistake on uranium. Economic, diplomatic reasons were sound, arms control logic not. Hear @Cirincione bit.ly/sdfALG

#ALPnc mistake on uranium. Economic, diplomatic reasons were sound, arms control logic not. Read @najtaylor bit.ly/vhT86g

#ALPnc mistake on uranium. Economic, diplomatic reasons were sound, arms control logic not. Legal view: bit.ly/rx5aJh

#ALPnc mistake on uranium. Economic, diplomatic reasons were sound, arms control logic not. Local specialist: bit.ly/w52bMi

#ALPnc mistake on uranium. Economic, diplomatic reasons were sound, arms control logic not. MP opposition: bit.ly/tIsQph

#ALPnc mistake on uranium. Economic, diplomatic reasons were sound, arms control logic not. Dire US warning: bit.ly/kY99fW

@acorn Yes, as we were warning by MIT research re. previous US deal. Well spotted same forces here: bit.ly/sIuqwh

Follow NAJ Taylor on Twitter: @najtaylor

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  • 1
    Scott
    Posted November 28, 2011 at 4:32 pm | Permalink

    Well since the fact that India made it onto the Security council themselves in 2010 seems to indicate that selling them uranium won’t be a problem . And we are looking pretty good in comparison to Pakistan (which will join the security council in 2012).
    Nuclear non-proliferation doesn’t appear to be a core component deciding membership of the security council.

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