The perfectly reasonable Qantas statement yesterday about how the Dreamliner 787 issues would be all over before it took delivery of any for Jetstar is looking shakier with every media leak in the US.
It isn’t just that the FAA has grounded the 787, but that the problem that caused an emergency landing of an ANA jet in Japan yesterday is now looking fundamentally different in nature to the battery fire that broke out in a Japan Airlines Dreamliner at Boston’s Logan airport on 7 January, with the design and integrity of the advanced electrical systems that link to them appearing to be a common factor.
Dominic Gates at The Seattle Times has the graphic details in his latest report. But there is more, much more.
In its apparent haste to cut corners and ‘assist’ Boeing the FAA has created a paper trail that will severely embarrass the regulator, and no doubt horrify 787 customers as it gives rise to any notion of a major redesign and recertification program, should that prove necessary.
Suppressing that paper trail may prove impossible. One of the first weak points in the FAA case that it has been thorough and tough in in certifying the 787 to the point where it can scare the daylights out of airlines and passengers alike, could prove to be that of whistleblower Michael Leon, who raised grave doubts about the safety of the batteries and associated systems being proposed for the Dreamliners in 2006, the year before Boeing staged a sham roll out of the prototype 787.
The Leon case is complex, bitter and notorious, and it seems, unresolved. However the essentials were that while employed by Securaplane, which brought together mission critical battery assemblies for the 787, Leon wrote a critique of the technology that argued it was a safety of flight risk and that substitute battery technology should be used. A month after that, in November 2006, Securaplane’s main buildings were burned to the ground after a battery test went wrong. Leon was among those suffering injuries, some serious, as a result of the blaze. Early in 2007 after he had already fallen out with Securaplane’s management, it moved to force him out of his employment for refusing to ship what he considered an unsafe battery assembly to Boeing for use in the 787, and which malfuctioned once it was installed in a prototype airframe.
When your job is to sign something out as safe, and your employer wants you to sign, no matter what, the situation is never going to end well, for the employee, the company, or the customer.
References to the Leon case are starting to appear in US reports, and more are inevitable, as investigative reporters grapple with the business phenomenon of managements that will not hear cautionary or contrary voices, even when it is in their interests and those of their shareholders to deal fully with identifiable and quantifiable risks.
But caution before panic is always advisable. Its early days. We don’t know where the tricky bit of the FAA inquiry, which is into the actual certification process, will lead.
The 787 is not just revolutionary in its leveraging of lithium ion battery technology, but the use of powerful on board generators to electrically replace the use of pressurised bleed air from the engines for a range of functions such as cabin air pressurisation and flow.
Its most celebrated feature is the use of thin load bearing pressure cycle sensitive cabin cages woven from carbon fibre reinforced plastic tape, glued together with epoxy resins and baked in giant autoclaves or industrial ovens.
The weight saving goals set for this technology may not yet have quite been realised on the early 787s, but there is no voice in aero engineering that isn’t convinced that as the Dreamliner series matures and lessons are learned, later builds will deliver on the potential of high composite pressure cycle sensitive load bearing components, as compared to the use of monolithic assemblies of carbon fibre found in earlier jet airliners since the early 80s.
What is now coming under scrutiny at the FAA, and worryingly, by the FAA, is whether or not all of the new technologies in the 787 have been appropriately tested and certified.
The potential for more delays to the Dreamliner doing what it was sold to do are both significant and obvious.